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Abstract
We study the incentives to acquire information from exclusive news sources versus informa-
tion from popular sources in a CARA-normal asset market. Each trader is able to observe one
of a finite number of news sources. Clustering on the most precise source can happen for two
reasons. One is standard: traders do not care that they dilute others’ profits by trading on the
same information. The other reason is more novel: traders with diﬀerent information sets may
respond to the same news diﬀerently — when this is so, they can benefit by coordinating their
attention on the same news source in order to take opposite sides of the market. News from such
a source will generate abnormal volume that need not be accompanied by large price movement.
Furthermore, we show that as the number of sources grows, traders concentrate their attention
on a few of the best ones, leaving most information unexploited.
1 Introduction
We study a single period asset market in which there are a limited number of “news sources,” each
of which provides a signal (some more precise than others) about the asset value. Each agent can
monitor one of these news sources, and thus observe its signal, prior to trading. In equilibrium, some
news sources will be relatively popular (monitored by many traders), while others are relatively
exclusive, or ignored altogether. We ask whether traders ever have incentives to cluster on popular
news sources, and if so, what implications this has for aggregate market outcomes such as the
informativeness of the asset price and the volume of trade.
The type of news sources that we have in mind could be analysts, brokerages, investment
newsletters, company insiders, columns in the Wall Street Journal, or the like. A signal from a
news source could be a revision by the analyst, a new recommendation from the brokerage or
newsletter, a leak by the insider, or new information in the newspaper. Our premise is that by
dedicating time and attention to monitoring a source, a trader can obtain, digest, and use new
information from that source before it becomes widely known (and perfectly incorporated into the
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market price). The idea that time and attention are limited is captured, in a stylized way, by
restricting each trader to monitoring a single news source.1 Our market should be understood to
clear at this early stage of dissemination, when only the traders who have been monitoring a news
source are able to act on its new signal.
Because the model has many traders and few news sources, we will usually speak of relatively
exclusive sources — that is, followed by relatively few traders — rather than private ones. There
are standard reasons to expect traders to prefer more exclusive sources: all else equal, popular
news should be more fully incorporated into the asset price, eroding the profits of those who try
to trade on it. However, at times, casual observation seems to suggest that many traders pay
attention to the same news sources. For example, a recommendation from a high profile analyst
can generate dramatic movement in a stock’s price and turnover. Furthermore, one sometimes
hears a countervailing argument that “it is important to understand what other people know.” To
evaluate these arguments, we deem traders to be clustering on a news source when their actions
produce an excessive impact on the asset price, trading volume, or both. Our notion of “excessive”
accounts for the fact that more informative sources (those with more precise signals) should move
the price more than less informative ones.
In equilibrium, more precise news sources are always more popular, and clustering can occur
through two channels. In the first, traders who dislike popularity per se (for the standard reasons)
accept it as the cost of acquiring a more precise signal. High quality, popular news becomes ex-
cessively incorporated into the price (relative to its precision, and the precision of other signals),
essentially because individuals trading on this news are not concerned with how their actions col-
lectively aﬀect the informativeness of the market price. Lower quality news sources may be ignored
entirely — indeed, we show that as the number of news sources grows, traders become so concen-
trated on the best ones that the fraction of sources that are ignored goes to one. Consequently, the
price can be quite ineﬃcient.
The second channel for clustering involves traders who, due to diﬀerences in their information
sets, use the same news source in diﬀerent and opposing ways. Specifically, we suppose that some
traders must place market orders, and thus face price risk, while others place limit orders.2 A
market order trader is endowed with additional private information about the asset. To mitigate
his price risk, he must try to assess whether this private information is good or bad news relative
to what the rest of the market knows. One way to do this is to monitor a popular news source,
as a proxy for the price, and trade against it. When the two types of trader follow the same
news source, they have a symbiotic relationship. By selling on good news from the source, market
order traders tend to reduce its correlation with the price, making it more attractive to limit order
traders. Conversely, by buying on good news, limit order traders make the source a better proxy for
the price, and thus more attractive to market order traders. This symbiosis can lead most traders
to monitor the same news source. When this occurs, a new signal from the source will generate
1Allowing a trader to monitor multiple news sources would complicate the analysis, but should not change the
results too substantially.
2Possible motivations for this setting will be discussed later.
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moderately excessive price movement (because the countervailing trades cancel out) and a very
large spike in trading volume. One implication of this is that two pieces of news that appear to be
of roughly similar fundamental importance can generate drastically diﬀerent amounts of volume.
Our asset market is in the tradition of Hellwig [22], Grossman and Stiglitz [18], and Diamond
and Verrecchia [8], among others. There are risk averse (CARA) strategic traders and noise traders
who provide liquidity, and signals are normally distributed. Orders are placed simultaneously,
and the asset price is determined by a market clearing condition, as in Kyle [28]. As in the
competitive rational expectations equilibrium literature, strategic traders form correct beliefs about
the functional relationship between signals, orders, and the market price. However, we depart
from that literature by assuming that only limit order traders can condition their demand on the
realized price; market order traders cannot. Information acquisition in such markets has been
extensively studied, but usually under the assumption that informed traders’ signals are either
perfectly correlated, as in Grossman and Stiglitz, or independent, as in Verrecchia [38].3 With a
few notable exceptions, there has been little study of whether agents permitted to choose which
information to acquire will concentrate on the same information as other agents.
Market microstructure models that include both market and limit orders are a relatively recent
development, and most of these models have focused on sequential trading with new orders clearing
against an existing limit order book (or in some cases, against a market-maker’s quotes as well).
An early example with one stage of arrivals and fixed order types is Glosten [16], followed by
Chakravarty and Holden [7] and Handa and Schwartz [20], where a trader is able to choose which
type of order to use.4 Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan [17] develop a fully dynamic model with limit
and market orders which they solve numerically. These studies generally support the idea that
market orders have the virtue of immediate execution but are exposed to price risk, while limit
orders are exposed to execution risk (the chance that an order fails to execute in a timely way)
and adverse selection risk (the danger that a buy order is more likely to execute if bad news about
the asset arrives later, and vice versa for sell orders). Loosely, we would expect a trader who is
impatient about execution to favor a market order; one reason for this impatience could be that he
has private information that is particularly time sensitive. (And conversely for a relatively patient
trader.) In our model, these trade-oﬀs between order types will remain in the background, as
unmodeled motivation for an exogenous distribution of limit and market order traders.5
Outside of our focus on why traders might choose to acquire the same signals, there are other
ways in which financial actors may make similar decisions about information.6 Grundy and Mc-
3Manzano and Vives [30], which has traders with partially correlated signals, is one recent exception.
4Kyle [28] permits traders to choose from an extremely flexible class of demand schedules that includes both
market orders and our linear limit orders as special cases. However, in his setting, market orders are never optimal,
in part because there is no execution risk for limit orders.
5Admittedly, there is some awkwardness in using these expressly dynamic trade-oﬀs to motivate the order types
in a static game. We discuss ways to tighten this motivation a bit later, but ultimately it would be desirable to make
order choice endogenous.
6There are also substantial theoretical and empirical literatures examining herding in analyst and newsletter
recommendations. This herding by information providers is orthogonal to the herding by information acquirers that
we study. Throughout the paper we stick to the term “clustering” to avoid confusion with this other herding literature.
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Nichols [19] and Manzano and Vives [30], among others, study markets in which traders’ decisions
about how much private information to acquire, or how aggressively to trade on that information,
are strategic complements. Generally, the complementarity arises from a feedback loop between
individual actions and the informativeness of the market price, and as a consequence, there may
be multiple equilibria.
More closely related to us are models that allow traders to choose which information to acquire.
In an influential early paper, Admati and Pfleiderer [2] let traders acquire collections of signals
and provide conditions under which two diﬀerent signals are complements or substitutes to each
other, for a single trader. They show that the property of complementarity can be endogenous,
as the standalone and combined values of two signals depend on equilibrium properties of the
price. Complementary signals encourage all-or-nothing information acquisition, which generates a
diﬀerent sort of information concentration than the type we study: traders are either well informed
or uninformed, but not moderately informed. More recently, García and Vanden [15] study the
emergence of endogenous “mutual funds” when one trader can choose to buy a stake in the position
taken by another trader. In a multiple asset model, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp [36] show
that a trader may prefer to deepen his informational advantage on one asset rather than learn what
his competition knows about the other asset; they use this to shed light on the home bias puzzle.
The idea that traders might rationally choose to acquire the same information dates to Froot,
Scharfstein, and Stein [11]. Their mechanism relies traders with short term horizons and a random
trade timing assumption that ensures that popular information is incorporated into the price grad-
ually. A trader who acquires popular information can benefit from this price trend if he is fortunate
enough to trade early. This illustrates how a strategic complementarity can arise in the news that
traders choose to follow; in our interaction between limit and market orders, the complementarity
arises from a diﬀerent source, but the result is similar. In other papers the desirability of acquiring
popular information arises because traders have “keeping up with the Joneses” preferences (García
and Strobl [13]) or because spreading fixed costs of research across more traders makes popular
information more aﬀordable (Veldkamp [37]). In related work, Hellwig and Veldkamp [21] consider
general environments in which agents acquire information prior to playing a game; they show that
when the second-stage game has strategic complementarities, agents have an incentive to herd at
the information acquisition stage. One key to clustering in our model is that it can be rational for
diﬀerentially informed traders (in the sense that limit order traders “observe” the price, but market
order traders do not) to trade on opposite sides of the same piece of new information. Based on
similar logic, Dorn and Strobl [9] demonstrate how informed and uninformed traders may trade on
opposite sides of new public information in a model of the disposition eﬀect.
An advantage of using a large, static market is that we can precisely characterize how clustering
on news aﬀects the informational eﬃciency of the market price. In particular, like Froot, Scharfstein,
and Stein, we can distinguish ineﬃcient aggregation of the news sources that traders follow from
the ineﬃciency that arises because some sources are simply ignored altogether. Under certain
conditions, if the potential collective precision of all available news sources grows as N , then the
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number of acquired news sources, and the collective precision of acquired news grow no faster than√
N . These results complement a body of of work on the asymptotic informativeness of prices that
includes Vives [39] and [40] and García and Uroševi´c [14].
Our model yields several novel (and potentially testable) implications. With or without market
order traders, the asset price overweights information from higher quality (more precise) news
sources. Under the assumption that news will eventually be priced in correctly, this suggests that
the price impact of popular, high quality news will be more subject to reversals. With market order
traders, the model predicts that news from a prominent source (the most informative one with the
largest following) may generate trading volume that appears drastically disproportionate to its
informativeness. Existing empirical studies do not address these predictions directly, but there is
some suggestive indirect evidence that we will discuss after presenting the model and results.
The next section introduces the model. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium when there are only
limit order traders and describes the conditions under which traders’ attention is focused on a small
subset of news sources. In Section 4, market order traders are added, and we show that the two
order types may trade on opposite sides of the same news. Section 5 discusses how the results
relate to empirical evidence, and Section 6 oﬀers concluding remarks.
2 Model
The model has two stages; in the first stage strategic traders choose which information to acquire,
and in the second stage they trade and realize payoﬀs. We begin with the second stage, which is
conventional. There is a single asset with uncertain value θ which is traded in a single period. The
asset is traded by continuum of strategic traders of size L+M ; of these, a mass L are limit order
traders, while M are market order traders. There are also noise traders who submit aggregate
demand z ∼ N (0, sz). All strategic traders have CARA preferences over trading profits, with
initial wealth normalized to zero; if trader i buys net quantity qi at price p, then his ex post
realized utility is ui (qi) = −e−
1
γi qi(θ−p), where γi is his risk tolerance. We assume that all limit
(market) order traders have common risk tolerance γL (γM). A trader chooses an order strategy
qi (Ii) to maximize his expected utility E (ui (qi) | Ii), where Ii is his information set. The main
distinction between trader types is that only the information sets of limit order traders will include
the market price p, allowing them to condition their demand on it. The sequence of events is:
(i) traders simultaneously submit order strategies and noise trader demand is realized, (ii) the
equilibrium price p is determined by market-clearing, and (iii) trades are executed, θ is revealed,
and traders realize their payoﬀs. If we index limit and market order traders by l ∈ [0, L] and
m ∈ [0,M ], the market-clearing condition is:Z L
0
ql dl +
Z M
0
qm dm+ z ≡ 0 (1)
The determination of the price follows from the fact that limit orders ql will condition on p.
Next we turn to the information available to traders. First, there is a public signal w = θ+ εw,
5
with εw ∼ N(0, sw), that is observed by all traders; w could be considered a common prior about
θ. Next, there is private information: each market order trader m is endowed with an idiosyncratic
signal xm distributed N
¡θ, τ−1x ¢. For simplicity, limit order traders are not endowed with private
signals, but this is not critical. Finally, there is a finite set of N news sources, Y = {1, 2, ..., N}.
Each source n provides a common signal yn ∼ N(θ, τ−1n ) to its subscribers. Without loss of
generality, we rank the sources by precision: 0 < τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ ... ≤ τN−1 < τN .7 All of the signals
in the model are independent, conditional on θ, and we make the usual convention that the mean
of a continuum of i.i.d. random variables (in this case, the market order traders’ private signals) is
equal to its expectation.
At the information acquisition stage, each trader must choose one news source n ∈ Y to subscribe
to. A trader cannot see the content of the news — that is, the value yn — before choosing, but
their precisions are public. After traders simultaneously choose sources, each trader observes the
realizations of the signals in his information set. For a limit order (market order) trader who
acquires news source n, that information set is Il = {yn, w, p} (Im = {yn, w, xm}). While we
will not attempt to endogenize order types in this paper, one could imagine these information
sets arising from a trade-oﬀ in which agents with additional, time-sensitive private information xm
choose market orders to avoid delays in execution. Of course, since our model is static and all
orders execute simultaneously, one must take such a motivation rather figuratively.
By imposing a capacity limit on information acquisition rather than a cost or a price, we imagine
a situation in which the time and attention required to acquire, understand, and use a new signal
before its value expires represents an important constraint on traders. There are no explicit financial
costs to acquire a source, nor do news sources charge prices for their information. News sources are
not strategic players in the model, but we have in mind a story in which free information is a loss
leader that helps to bring in other types of business for the source. Such a strategy might make
sense given the diﬃculty of limiting access to raw information, and it does not seem too distant
from the approach that brokerages and investment banks take with their analysts. In Section 6
we briefly discuss how our model could be extended to incorporate price competition among news
sources.
Our equilibrium concept is essentially competitive rational expectations equilibrium, but with
the addition of the information acquisition stage and also the proviso that market order traders
cannot condition on the realized price. To be more explicit about this, note that any profile of
news source acquisition and order strategies by traders will induce some price function P over
the variables (~y,w, z, θ), where ~y = (y1, ..., yN ), such that the realized equilibrium price is given
by p = P (~y,w, z, θ).8 We assume that all traders correctly anticipate this functional relationship
(and that limit order traders additionally observe the realization p). Let ~l = (l1, l2, ..., lN) and
~m = (m1,m2, ...,mN ) denote the fractions of limit and market order traders choosing each news
7Keeping the most precise source unique (via the condition τN > τN−1) is not essential to the results, but it helps
in stating some of them concisely.
8We omit the xm signals because equilibrium price will depend only on the aggregate of these signals, and we have
assumed 1
L
R L
0
xm = θ.
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source, and let functions qnl () and q
n
m () denote the order strategy a trader of each type who acquired
news source n, with ~ql and ~qm the vectors of these functions. Finally, let Unl = E (E (ul (q
n
l ) | Il))
refer to the ex ante expected utility anticipated by a limit order trader who acquires source n,
before receiving his information. Define Unm similarly.
We say that order strategies are interim optimal (with respect to an anticipated price function
P ) if for all n, qnl (Il) maximizes E (ul (qnl ) | Il) and qnm (Im) maximizes E (um (qnm) | Im). We will
say that news source choices are ex ante optimal if for any n such that ln > 0, we have Unl ≥ Un0l
for all n0 ∈ Y, and for any n such that mn > 0, we have Unm ≥ Un0m for all n0 ∈ Y .
Definition 1 A News Choice Equilibrium is a collection
n
~l, ~m, ~ql, ~qm, P
o
such that (i) the market-
clearing price generated by
n
~l, ~m, ~ql, ~qm
o
satisfies p = P (~y,w, z, θ), (ii) order strategies are interim
optimal with respect to P , and (iii) news source choices are ex ante optimal with respect to P .
Because traders are free to acquire any news sources they like, optimality requires that all
sources acquired by limit order traders must oﬀer them the same ex ante utility, and similarly for
sources acquired by market order traders. Throughout the paper, we will follow common practice
by restricting attention to equilibria in linear order strategies; that is, we will look for equilibria in
which qnl and q
n
m are linear functions of the variables in Il and Im. In this case, the pricing function
will take the form
P (~y,w, z, θ) =XN
n=1
λnyn + λww + λθθ + ρz (2)
for some coeﬃcients ~λ = (λ1, ...,λN), λw, λθ, and ρ. When this is the case, correct expectations
about the form of P reduce to anticipating these coeﬃcients correctly. In the next section, linear
equilibria are characterized for the somewhat simpler case in which all traders use limit orders
(M = 0).
We will consider two definitions of clustering over news sources. The second one, which is
based on excessive impact on trading volume, is deferred until later. The first definition is based
on a source’s price impact. In a linear equilibrium, the news sources’ contribution to the price
can be summarized by the normalized variable Y =
PN
n=1 λ0nyn, where λ0n = λn/
PN
n=1 λn. Y is
most informative about the asset value θ when each source has a price impact proportional to its
precision; that is, when λn/τn is constant across n. When this condition fails, we will say that
there is clustering on the news with higher values of λn/τn. An extreme version of this occurs if
some news sources are not acquired at all and have price impacts of zero. Since this definition is
rather inclusive, it is not too surprising that clustering occurs in equilibrium; what will be more
interesting is the size and scope of these excessive price impacts.
2.1 Preliminaries: Orders and Ex Ante Utility with CARA Preferences
For now, we fix a price function P , and consider the behavior of traders. Notice that the price
function in (2) is unbiased — the unconditional expectation E (θ − p) of per unit profit is zero.
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Furthermore, the per-unit profit θ − p is distributed normally: θ − p ∼ N (0, sp), where
sp = E
³
(p− θ)2
´
=
XN
n=1
λ2n/τn + λ2w/τw + ρ2/τ z . (3)
As a preliminary step, we introduce well known general expressions for the quantity of a risky
asset that a trader demands, and his ex ante utility, with exponential preferences and normal
uncertainty. Let R (I) = E (θ − p | I) be a trader’s expectation of the per-unit return, conditional
on information set I, and let s (I) = var (θ − p | I) = E
³
(R (I)− (θ − p))2 | I
´
be the variance
of the error in his estimate. Call τ (I) = s (I)−1 the precision of the trader’s information; note
that the values of s (I) and τ (I) do not depend on the realization of the random variables in I. If
the trader has risk tolerance γ, then he chooses a quantity q to maximize the certainty equivalent
wealth R (I) q − s(I)2γ q2 which yields an optimal order
q (I) = γτ (I)R (I) (4)
Furthermore, prior to receiving any information, the ex ante expected utility of a trader who expects
to acquire information set I is
UI = −
p
s (I) /s (p) . (5)
For details, see Grossman and Stiglitz [18] and Admati and Pfleiderer [2]. The notable distinction in
(4) and (5) is that we have not yet made any assumptions about whether I includes p, so the price
remains inside the expectation operator in R (I) and s (I).9 As a consequence of (5), the optimal
information acquisition decision of a trader is simply to choose the information set I that gives him
the most precise estimate of θ − p. That is, he maximizes τ (I) over all available information sets.
For market order traders, the wrinkle will be that a precise estimate of θ − p requires estimating
both the asset value and the market-clearing price.
3 Equilibrium with Limit Order Traders
This section studies the case in which all traders submit limit orders; thus for now set M = 0.
To characterize equilibria, we use (4) and (5) to develop detailed expressions for optimal orders
and ex ante utility. With the latter, we can construct indiﬀerence curves over news sources that
demonstrate a trade-oﬀ between a source’s precision and its price impact. Finally we impose
consistency (P must be generated by traders’ actions) and show that equilibria exist.
3.1 Optimal Limit Order Strategies and Ex Ante Utility
Consider a limit order trader who observes information set Il = {yn, w, p} and expects that the
price to satisfy (2) with
PN
n=1 λn + λw + λθ = 1. Because this trader observes the price, his order
9Otherwise, (5) is just a special case of Proposition 3.1 in Admati and Pfleiderer [2], with initial wealth normalized
to zero and E (θ − p) = 0.
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and utility hinge on his estimate of θ: R (Il) = E (θ | Il)− p and s (Il) = var (θ | Il). We will write
snl = s (Il) and τˆnl = τ (Il) = (snl )−1 to emphasize the dependence of his estimate precision on his
news source n. Because of (5), a trader’s decision about which news source to follow boils down to
choosing the source that maximizes τˆnl . By standard properties of the normal distribution, E (θ | Il)
will be a convex combination of the elements in Il; given (4), this implies that his demand can be
written in the linear form
qnl (yn, w, p) = βny (yn − p) + βnw(w − p) (6)
for some coeﬃcients βny and βnw. In order to derive these coeﬃcients and determine the trader’s
preferences over news sources, we must derive his estimate of θ and τˆnl . While the errors in signals
yn and w are independent, the trader must account for the fact that both signals are correlated
with the price. To deal with this, we construct a transformation of the price p to strip out the
influence of the other two signals. Let
ζn = 11− λw − λn (p− λww − λnyn) =
1P
n0 6=n λn0 + λθ
³X
n0 6=n λn0yn0 + λθθ + ρz
´
The set of random variables {w, yn, ζn} is informationally equivalent to Il, but now those variables
are also independent, conditional on θ. Furthermore, ζn is distributed N
³
θ, τ−1ξn
´
, with precision
that can be written τ ζn = (1 − λw − λn)2/
¡
sp − λ2w/τw − λ2n/τn
¢
. Then by standard results for
normal distributions, the trader’s optimal estimate of θ is a precision-weighted average of w, yn,
and ζn, and the precision of that estimate is simply τˆnl = τw + τn + τ ζn . With this in hand, it is
straightforward to compute the coeﬃcients of the trader’s order strategy:
βny = γL
µ
τn − τ ζn
λn
1− λw − λn
¶
= γLτn
µ
1− λnτn
1− λw − λn
sp − λ2w/τw − λ2n/τn
¶
(7)
βnw = γL
µ
τw − τ ζn
λw
1− λw − λn
¶
= γLτw
µ
1− λwτw
1− λw − λn
sp − λ2w/τw − λ2n/τn
¶
(8)
In comparing news sources, it suﬃces to compare τˆnl − τw = τn+ τ ζn , since the additional term
τw is constant with respect to n. To make this comparison, we define a function
f(τ ,λ) = τ + (1− λw − λ)
2
sp − λ2w/τw − λ2/τ
(9)
such that τˆnl = τw + f (τn,λn). A limit order trader who believes that the price follows P will
weakly prefer source n over source n0, if and only if f (τn,λn) ≥ f (τn0 ,λn0). Thus, level curves
of f represent indiﬀerence curves over combinations of precision and price impact. As a useful
hypothetical case, let us say that a news source n is worthless to a limit order trader if it gives him
the same utility that he would earn with the information {w, p} alone. Worthless news must satisfy
f(τn,λn) = f0, where f0 = (1−λw)2sp−λ2w/τw and τw + f0 is the precision of a trader who sees {w, p}; with
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Figure 1: Limit order indiﬀerence curves
some simplification one can see that n is worthless if (τn,λn) lies along the line λτ = sp−λ
2
w/τw
1−λw in
τ -λ space. This worthless news line marks a transition in traders’ order strategies. We say that a
trader with source n buys on good news (sells on good news) from n if βny is positive (negative).
Lemma 1 A trader with source n buys on good news from n if its price impact to precision ratio
is lower than that of a worthless source: that is, if λnτn <
sp−λ2w/τw
1−λw . Conversely, he sells on good
news from n if its price impact to precision ratio is higher than that of a worthless source.
Proof. This follows directly from (7) and basic algebra.
In a similar manner, one can show that this trader buys on the public signal (βnw > 0) if and only
if λwτw <
sp−λ2n/τn
1−λn . For limit order traders, selling on good news from a source n — or equivalently,
buying on bad news — can only arise if the price severely overreacts to n. In this case, holding the
price fixed, worse news from n implies either relatively strong noise trader demand or relatively
good news from other (more precise) sources. It is the second possibility that, in principle, could
induce trades against n. The next lemma characterizes indiﬀerence curves for signals whose value
is positive (that is, f(τn,λn) > f0).
Lemma 2 (Limit order indiﬀerence curves)
i) Fix λ1, ...,λN , λw, and ρ. For K > f0, solutions to the equation f (τ ,λ) = K lie on an ellipse
characterized by a chord AB that does not depend on K plus two additional points C and D such
that A = (0, 0), B = ( (1−λw)
2
sp−λ2w/τw , 1−λw), C = (K, 1−λw), D = (K−
(1−λw)2
sp−λ2w/τw , 0), and the ellipse
has vertical tangencies (dτ/dλ = 0) at A and C. Furthermore, if K > K 0 > f0 then the ellipse
f(τ ,λ) = K 0 lies strictly in the interior of f(τ ,λ) = K (except for tangencies at A and B).
ii) Thus a limit order trader strictly prefers source n to source n0 if (τn0 ,λn0) lies in the interior
of the ellipse f (τ ,λ) = f (τn,λn). If (τn0 ,λn0) lies on this ellipse, then the trader is indiﬀerent
between n and n0.
Some typical indiﬀerence curves are displayed in the left panel of Figure 1. Note that the chord
AB lies along the worthless news line. In this example, a trader would prefer the less precise signal
yn over the more precise yn0 on the inner ellipse because the price impact of the latter is too large.
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Some of the possible precision-price impact combinations on these level curves seem unlikely to
arise in equilibrium. For example, if source n lies along arc AB, then its price impact is so large
that an agent who observes good news from n would sell on it. However, if traders sell on good
news from n, its price impact will be negative, not positive. Similarly, if source n lies along arc
AD, then its price impact is negative. This could only arise if traders sell on good news from n, but
they would want to do the opposite. Finally, if n lies along BC, then λw + λn > 1, implying that
some other source must have a negative price impact. In the next section, we show that these three
cases are indeed incompatible with equilibrium, so for practical purposes, one can concentrate on
the arc CD (as shown in the right panel of Figure 1). Arc CD looks like a conventional convex
indiﬀerence curve: traders prefer news that is more accurate and less incorporated into the price.
Because in equilibrium, traders must be indiﬀerent between all news sources that are acquired,
price impacts will need to adjust so that the precision-price impacts pairs for all acquired sources
lie along a single curve such as CD.
3.2 Limit Order Equilibrium
Now we close the model by deriving the price function that arises from the news source choices and
linear demands discussed above. If traders are distributed over sources according to ~l and submit
orders as described in (6), the market-clearing condition becomes:
L
XN
n=1
ln
¡βnyyn + βnww − (βny + βnw)p¢+ z ≡ 0 (10)
Solving for p delivers a price function of the form (2) with coeﬃcients
λn = ρLlnβny , λw = ρLPNn=1 lnβnw , λθ = 0 , ρ = ³LPNn=1 ln(βny + βnw)´−1 (11)
Note that the quantity on the left-hand side of (10) is the aggregate excess demand at price p. We
call a equilibrium regular if it has the following two features.
A1. Aggregate excess demand is decreasing in p. (That is, −LPNn=1 ln(βny + βnw) is strictly
negative.)
A2. λw ∈ (0, 1)
Condition A2 says that good news from the public signal has a non-negative impact on the
price, but not more than one-for-one.
Proposition 1 A regular linear equilibrium exists.
Proof. This is a special case of Proposition 6.
The intuitive flavor of the proof is fairly familiar: if traders respond to their own information
too aggressively, the price will be quite informative, encouraging all traders to rely more on the
price and less on private information. Conversely, if all traders rely too much on the price, it will be
uninformative and they will be forced to turn back to their private information. The proposition
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Figure 2: Equilibrium with limit order traders
is silent on uniqueness of linear equilibria satisfying A1 and A2, and furthermore, we have not
ruled out the possibility of additional equilibria. (However, equilibria violating A1 or A2 seem very
unlikely, and if they do exist, they would have rather perverse features.) Next we confirm that the
counterintuitive possibilities mentioned in the indiﬀerence curve discussion cannot occur.
Lemma 3 In a regular linear equilibrium, the price impact of every source is positive: λn ≥ 0 (and
consequently, λn ≤ 1− λw) for all n. Furthermore, no trader sells on good news from his source.
Proof. If λn were strictly negative, then given 1 − λw positive by A2, we would have βny > 0
by Lemma 1. But then (11) and A1 imply λn > 0, a contradiction. Furthermore, we havePN
n=1 λn = 1 − λw, so λn > 1 − λw would imply that λn0 < 0 for some other n0 6= n, which
we have showed is impossible. If traders observing n were to sell on good news, then βny < 0 and
A1 would imply λn < 0, which we have ruled out.
A typical equilibrium is summarized concisely in Figure 2. The precision and price impact of
each acquired source must lie along the CD arc of a single level curve of f (τ ,λ); in the figure this
is sources 2 through 6. Any unacquired source must lie inside this level curve, along the λ = 0 axis
(source 1, in the figure). This example has the following general features:
1. There is a threshold τ , such that news sources that are less precise than this threshold are
not acquired. (If this threshold is low enough, all sources are acquired.)
2. Traders cluster on more precise news sources: λn/τn is increasing in n.
Mathematically, the second point follows directly from the convexity of arc CD. The intuition
for both points is also straightforward. After controlling for his own source, the amount that a
trader can infer about other news n0 from the price depends on the signal-to-noise ratio of λn0
relative to noise trader demand. A trader who is willing to choose a less precise source n, with
τn < τn0 , must be able to compensate by learning relatively more from the price (controlling for
yn) than he could by choosing n0 instead. This turns out to require λn0/τn0 large and λn/τn small.
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ε 0 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 3 4
l10,000sup 0 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.47 0.72 0.82 0.87
λ10,000sup 0 0.05 0.11 0.29 0.59 0.87 0.94 0.97
Table 1: Approximate limiting influence (N = 10000) of the superior signal in Example 1. Other
parameters: γ = 1, L = 1, τ¯ = 1, τw = 0, τ z = 1.
Point 1 reflects the fact that profits from a popular source never erode completely, due to the
presence of noise trader demand and the cap on trading imposed by risk aversion. In some cases,
the profits available from a low quality source, even a very exclusive one, cannot compete.
To explore the scope of concentration on news in this model, we present a few examples and
limiting cases for which particularly sharp results are possible. One such case is the limit as
the number of news sources grows large. Many market models begin from the assumption that
there are many independent signals available and that each trader is endowed with a diﬀerent one.
This resembles the situation in our model when N is large, except that traders can decide which
information to acquire.
Example 1: One superior news source
Consider a market with N − 1 equally precise signals, each with precision τ¯ and one superior
signal with precision τ¯ + ε. Models often assume that signals are identically distributed, but this
is a matter of convenience — there is no particular reason to think that real-world information
sources are all equally precise. This example explores the eﬀect of a minimal amount of quality
heterogeneity. The following result shows that the best source attracts disproportionate interest,
and has a disproportionate influence on the price, even when there are infinitely many signals to
choose from. Let λNsup and lNsup denote the price impact and “market share” (the fraction of acquiring
traders) of the superior signal in an equilibrium with N news sources.10 As the number of news
sources grows, we have:
Proposition 2 For the model of Example 1,
i) The price impact and market share of a non-superior source tend to zero with N .
ii) The price impact and market share of the superior source remain positive even as N grows
large. That is, λNsup and lNsup are bounded away from zero uniformly in N .)
Table 1 illustrates the excess influence of the superior signal in the large N limit for a case with
no public signal and τ¯ = 1. The results indicate that when traders can choose which information
to acquire, it is not innocuous to assume away quality heterogeneity. When quality diﬀerences
are relatively small, a market observer might find it puzzling and arbitrary to see news from one
of these sources move the market price substantially, when similar news from other sources has a
much smaller eﬀect.
In the numerical example of Table 1, the lower quality sources have a collective market share
1 − lNsup that remains positive as the number of sources grows, even though the share of each
10We know that such an equilibrium exists; the results below do not depend on whether it is unique.
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individual source vanishes. While the price does not aggregate these signals eﬃciently, in principle
the collective information that traders acquire would reveal the asset value perfectly (N →∞), if
one could only weight this information properly. However, the outcome can be starker than this:
under some conditions, all news sources except for the superior one are ignored! The next result
applies not just to Example 1, but for any configuration of news sources, and for any τw ≥ 0.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the second best news source N − 1 satisfies D ≡ (LγL)2 τ zτN−1 < 1
and the best news source N satisfies τN ≥ 11−DτN−1. Then there is an equilibrium in which all
traders acquire source N .
The conditions for Proposition 3 tend to be met when the precision advantage of the best
news source is large and opportunities to profit from noise traders are relatively large (τ z small)
and unexploited (L and γL small). In such an equilibrium, traders acquire information that is
(endogenously) perfectly correlated, even though independent news is available.11 The asset price
will be extremely sensitive to this news: λN = 1. Furthermore, the necessary conditions do not
depend on the number of sources, just the first and second best precisions. If we let N grow,
holding τN−1 and τN fixed, then we can easily have a situation in which potentially available
information reveals θ perfectly, but the collective precision of information that traders actually
acquire is bounded at τN . The last two results demonstrate the possibility of concentration at the
very best news source. The next example shows that if we broaden the focus to the top few news
sources, the phenomenon of concentration at the top is quite general.
Example 2: General quality distributions as N →∞
This example looks at the concentration of traders’ news choices are in a large N setting that
is more general than Example 1. The idea will be that in the N → ∞ limit, there is an arbitrary
cumulative distribution function Ψ over the precision of news sources. We assume that Ψ is defined
over a compact interval [τL, τH ] and is Lipschitz continuous and invertible. For each N ≥ 1,
construct a market with N news sources whose precisions are spaced evenly across the percentiles
of Ψ. That is, for market N , set τ1 = Ψ−1(1/N), τ2 = Ψ−1(2/N), ... , τn = Ψ−1(n/N), and
τN = Ψ−1(1) = τH . As N grows, the news sources populate the interval [τL, τH ] more and more
finely in such a way that their distribution approximates Ψ.12 Notice that because the precision of
each source is bounded below by τL, the collective precision of the information available to traders
grows at rate N .
Proposition 4 In the model of Example 2, as N → ∞, the fraction of sources that are acquired
shrinks to zero and the collective precision of acquired information grows at a rate no faster than√
N .
11We conjecture that the result could be strengthened to show that, when the conditions hold, a linear equilibrium
must have all traders acquiring N . That is, the equilibrium is unique. Numerical investigation strongly suggests that
this is true, but we do not have a proof.
12Of course, a simpler approach would be to sample N times from Ψ. The advantage of the construction we use is
tractability — keeping the precisions non-stochastic avoids detours to deal with the Central Limit Theorem. However,
there is no reason to expect the results to change materially under a sampling-based approach.
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Proposition 4 shows that when there are many news sources and a trader can only follow one of
them, clustering on a small fraction of the highest quality sources is the norm. As a consequence,
the asset price will appear to be oversensitive to a small set of news items and underresponsive
to the rest. Of course, whenever we say that asset-relevant information is ignored, we mean that
this is true within the time horizon — a single episode of market-clearing — covered by the model.
In the long run, one would expect all relevant information to become incorporated into the price;
loosely interpreted, our results suggest a framework for thinking about why some news might be
incorporated more slowly than others.
The results so far focus on the supply of information holding other parameters fixed, including
the volume of noise trading and the level of risk tolerance. However, if traders holding a popular
signal yn are to make a profit, there must be a wedge between that signal and the price. That
wedge is generated by the fact that risk aversion limits the price impact of yn, while noise trading
generates price movement that is unrelated to yn. A reduction in noise trading or an increase in risk
tolerance should tend to penalize traders with popular news, and thus encourage them to broaden
the base of information acquired. This intuition is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 For fixed N , and any sequence of equilibria as γL → ∞ or τ z → ∞, the co-
eﬃcients of the equilibrium price function converge to λw = τw
³PN
n=1 τn + τw
´−1
and λn =
τn
³PN
n=1 τn + τw
´−1
, for all n ∈ {1, ..., N}. That is, every source is acquired and weighted ac-
cording to its precision in the price.
Models with exogenous information often predict that an increase in risk tolerance should
encourage traders to use the information they have more aggressively; alone, or in combination
with a decrease in noise trading, this should tend to boost the signal to noise ratio in the price.
We extend the spirit of those results to say that because this more aggressive trading reduces the
returns on shared information, traders have greater incentives to acquire more exclusive information
when risk tolerance increases.
4 Equilibrium with Both Limit and Market Order Traders
Now we relax the constraint that M = 0 and allow market order traders in the model. The next
section characterizes their order strategies and preferences over news sources. Then we examine
how limit and market order traders interact in equilibrium.
4.1 Market Order Traders: Order Strategies and Ex Ante Utility
Consider a market order trader with information set Im = {yn, w, xm}. Just as with the limit order
traders, his demand and ex ante utility are determined by (4) and (5), but because he cannot observe
the price, their exact forms will be a bit diﬀerent. For this trader, the precision of his estimate of
θ−p is a diﬀerent quantity from the precision of his estimate of θ. Write the former as τˆnm = τ (Im)
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(with snm = s (Im) = (τˆnm)−1) and the latter as tnm. Because the signals in Im are independent, his
estimate of θ, E (θ | Im) is just the precision-weighted average of yn, w, and xm, and so we have
tnm = τn + τw + τx. Then because he expects the price function to obey (2), it is straightforward
to show that his estimate of the price is E (p | Im) = λnyn + λww+ (1− λw − λn)E (θ | Im), so we
arrive at an estimate E (θ − p | Im) = (λn + λw)E (θ | Im)−λnyn−λww of the per-unit profit from
a purchase. Direct computations then yield the following linear order strategy.
Lemma 4 The demand of a market order trader m who believes the price to be described by (2)
and chooses information source yn is a linear function qnm(xm, yn, w) = αnxxm+αnyyn+αnww where
αny = γM τˆnm(λn + λw)
µτn
tnm
− λnλn + λw
¶
, (12)
αnw = γM τˆnm(λn + λw)
µτw
tnm
− λwλn + λw
¶
, and (13)
αnx = γM τˆnm(λn + λw) τxtnm = −
¡αny + αnw¢ (14)
Notice that the trader always buys on good news from his idiosyncratic signal (αnx ≥ 0 as long
as the price impacts of yn and w are not negative), and because αny + αnw = −αnx this implies that
he must sell on good news either from w or yn (or perhaps both). We will discuss intuition for this
momentarily, but first we characterize τˆnm (and therefore, his ex ante utility).
Lemma 5 For a market order trader who acquires news source n, the precision of his estimate of
θ − p is given by
(τˆnm)−1 = snm = sp − λ
2
w
τw −
λ2n
τn +
(λn + λw)2
τn + τx + τw
Market order preferences over news sources can be ranked by τˆnm.
Proof. Using the expressions above, we can write E (θ − p | Im)− (θ − p) as
(λn + λw) (E (θ | Im)− θ) +
⎛
⎝X
n0 6=n
λn0 (yn0 − θ) + ρz
⎞
⎠
The two terms in parentheses are independent and have variances (λn + λw)2 /tnm and sp−λ2n/τn−
λ2w/τw respectively, from which the result follows.
For reference, note that the precision of a (hypothetical) trader who cannot observe any news
source reduces to
¡τ0m¢−1 = s0m = sp− λ2wτw+ λ2wτx+τw . For a comparison across news sources, there is no
harm in stripping away terms that are constant with respect to n, so the next result is immediate.
Lemma 6 A market order trader who believes the price to be described by (2) will choose an
information source that maximizes
g (τn,λn) ≡ λ
2
n
τn −
(λn + λw)2
tnm
(15)
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Figure 3: Market order indiﬀerence curves
across all n.
Just as with limit orders, we can treat g(τ ,λ) = g(τn,λn) as an indiﬀerence curve representing
the pairs in (τ ,λ) space that give a market order trader the same ex ante utility as (τn,λn). In
this case, worthless news satisfies the condition τnm = τ0m, or equivalently, g(τn,λn) = g0, where
g0 = − λ2wτx+τw . Simplifying this condition, we find that source n is worthless if and only if it satisfies
λn/τn = λwτx+τw ; not coincidentally, this is also the condition under which the trader puts zero
weight on yn in his market order. If λn/τn < λwτx+τw or λn/τn > λwτx+τw , then source n is valuable,
but for diﬀerent reasons: in the first case, the trader will buy on good news from n, while in the
latter case he will sell on good news.
Lemma 7 (Market order indiﬀerence curves) If source n is not worthless (g(τn,λn) > g0), then the
set of pairs (τ ,λ) satisfying g(τ ,λ) = g(τn,λn) lies on one branch of a hyperbola, with a tangency to
the λ-axis at (τ ,λ) = (0, 0). “Broader-jawed” hyperbolas are associated with higher ex ante utility.
Some typical indiﬀerence curves are sketched in Figure 3.13 Worthless news lies along the dashed
line. A trader will buy on good news from his source if it lies below this line, such as source n in
the figure. If it lies above this line, such as source n0 in the figure, he will sell on good news. We
will say that a source lies on the upper or lower branch respectively of an indiﬀerence curve if it
lies above or below the worthless news line. As drawn, a trader would prefer source n over source
n0, as n lies on the higher indiﬀerence curve.
The intuition is straightforward. Because a market order trader faces execution risk (she cannot
condition her order on p), her profit depends on estimating θ − p. To do this, she needs signals
that distinguish θ from p or vice versa. For this purpose, signals that are strongly correlated with θ
(high τn) and weakly correlated with p (low λn) are useful as proxies for θ; these are the signals for
which the trader buys on good news. Alternatively, signals that are strongly correlated with p and
13While all indiﬀerence curves approach the point (0, 0), this point belongs only to the worthless news indiﬀerence
curve. The reason that indiﬀerence curve grow close together near (0, 0) relates to the fact that a signal’s contribution
to variation in the price is on the order of λ2n/τn. This quantity can be quite diﬀerent for two diﬀerent signals, even
if both have (τn,λn) approaching (0, 0), and so utility can be quite diﬀerent as well.
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weakly correlated with θ (high λn and low τn) are valuable as proxies for p; the trader prefers to sell
when these signals are high. This provides another way to think about the zero-value indiﬀerence
curve: a signal is of no value precisely when a trader’s optimal market order does not condition
on it (αny = 0). It may be helpful to think of a trader as starting oﬀ with his private signal xm as
a proxy for θ and the public signal w as a proxy for p. If the public signal is a good price proxy,
additional news yn will be used to support xm. However, when price risk is large — in the sense
that w does not predict variation in p very well — the trader will seek out additional news that he
expects to cause excess price movement in order to trade against it.
4.2 Equilibrium
We will show that equilibria with both types of trader have the following features, some of which
carry over from the case with only limit order traders. The first three points are relatively self-
explanatory, while for the fourth we will need to be more specific about what is meant by excess
volume.
1. More precise news sources have excessive price impacts. Specifically, the ratio λn/τn is
increasing in n.
2. Segmentation of trader types. If a market order trader plans to buy on good news from his
source, then he follows a less precise, more exclusive source than a limit order trader would.
3. Sales on good news at the top. If any selling on good news takes place, it is done by market
order sellers who observe the most precise source.
4. Excess volume at the top. If there are sales on good news, then the volume of trade associated
with the most precise source yN is greater than its precision and price impact would otherwise
suggest.
The first step in characterizing equilibrium is to update equation (11), which expressed the
coeﬃcients of the market-clearing price generated by traders’ order strategies and distribution
across news sources. When market orders are present, these coeﬃcients become:
λn = ρ(Mmnαny + Llnβny ) , λw = ρPNn=1(Mmnαnw + Llnβnw) , (16)
λθ = 1− λw −PNn=1 λn , and ρ = ³LPNn=1 ln(βny + βnw)´−1
and the market-clearing condition isXN
n=1
©
(Mmnαny + Llnβny )yn + (Mmnαnw + Llnβnw)w +Mmnαnxθ − Lln(βny + βnw)p
ª
+z ≡ 0 (17)
Proposition 6 A regular linear equilibrium with both limit and market order traders exists. Fur-
thermore, any such equilibrium satisfies λn ∈ [0, 1− λw] for every news source n, and λn > 0 for
any news source that is acquired by either type of trader.
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As earlier, a source could only become negatively correlated with the price if traders trade
against its good news, but in fact this negative correlation would be an extra incentive to trade in
the same direction as its good news. From this point forward, our analysis will restrict attention
to equilibria that satisfy one additional restriction.
A3. In equilibrium, the price impact of the public signal satisfies λw/τw < sp.
We suspect that A3 is actually an implication of equilibrium, as it is satisfied in every com-
putational example we have studied, but we do not have a proof of this. In any case, A3 has a
sensible and appealing interpretation. Consider adding to the market a hypothetical limit trader
whose only information is {w, p}. The optimal order of this trader can be shown (see the limit
order strategies in the appendix) to be proportional to (τwsp − λw) (w − p), so A3 is equivalent to
the condition that this trader’s demand is downward sloping in the price.
In characterizing equilibria, A3 acts like a single-crossing condition — it ensures that a trader
planning to buy on good news will find high precision - high price impact news sources relatively
more attractive if he can place a limit order than he would if placing a market order. A hint of this
can been seen in the worthless news indiﬀerence curves. With a slight manipulation, A3 may be
written as λw/τw < ¡sp − λ2w/τw¢ / (1− λw), where the righthand side is the slope of the worthless
news indiﬀerence curve for limit order traders. Then because λw/ (τx + τw) < λw/τw, A3 implies
that limit order traders have a steeper worthless news indiﬀerence curve than market order traders
do. This relationship is generalized in Lemma 8.
Lemma 8 Fix an equilibrium and a news source n. Suppose that 0 ≤ λn ≤ 1 − λw and that, if
constrained to choose source n, a limit order trader would buy on good news. Then the limit order
indiﬀerence curve through (τn,λn) is strictly steeper at (τn,λn) than the market order indiﬀerence
curve through the same point.
The intuition behind this is fairly straightforward if market order traders would also prefer to
buy on good news at from source n. For a market order trader, a more precise signal may not be
helpful in discriminating θ from p if it is also more correlated with the price. For a limit order
trader, the role of the signal is not to distinguish θ from p — after all, this trader can condition on
p — but just to estimate θ. Thus, the downside of a higher price impact is less severe for the limit
order trader.
As earlier, the (τn,λn) pairs for all news sources chosen by limit order traders must lie along
a common indiﬀerence curve. Proposition 6 rules out the possibility that one of these sources lies
along the AD or BC arc from Figure 1. Next, we rule out segment AB.
Lemma 9 (i) If, in equilibrium, limit order traders would sell on good news at some source yn,
then market order traders would also sell on good news at that source. (ii) Consequently, limit
order traders never sell on good news in equilibrium.
Proof. (i) If limit order traders would sell on good news at yn only if λn > sp−λ2w/τw1−λw τn holds.
A3 implies that sp − λ2w/τw > (1− λw)λw/τw, and therefore, λwτw < sp−λ
2
w/τw
1−λw . Consequently, λn >
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Figure 4: Examples of equilibrium news source acquisition with N = 3. Equilibrium limit order
and market order indiﬀerence curves pictured. LO buy (sell) means limit order traders acquired
the source and buy (sell) on good news.
λwτw τn > λwτx+τw τn, so by Lemma 4, any market order trader at yn would also sell on good news. For
(ii), suppose limit order traders acquire n and sell on its good news, so λn > sp−λ2w/τw1−λw τn > 0holds.
Then βny < 0 and by part (i), αny < 0. But then (16) implies λn ≤ 0, a contradiction.
This result, which also has the flavor of a single-crossing property, is complementary to Lemma
8. Because market order traders need to find a proxy for p and limit order traders do not, the
former tend to be more disposed to trade against any particular signal than the latter are. We are
finally ready to characterize the equilibria of the model with both order types.
Proposition 7 Suppose that news source precisions are distinct. In any regular linear equilibrium
satisfying A3, there are threshold sources n¯1 and n¯2, with n¯1, n¯2 ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and n¯2 ≥ n¯1, such
that:
i. If n < n¯1, then source n is not acquired.
ii. Market order traders acquire all sources in {n¯1, ..., n¯2 − 1}. They may acquire n¯2 or N as well.
iii. Limit order traders acquire all sources {n¯2 + 1, ..., N}. They may acquire n¯2 as well.
iv. All limit order traders, and all market order traders who do not acquire N , buy on good news
from their sources.
v. Market order traders who acquire source N may sell on good news.
vi. The sequences {λn} and {λn/τn} are increasing, strictly for n ≥ n¯1.
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The condition that news sources have distinct precisions is not critical; it is only imposed to
avoid a verbose description of special cases.14 Various configurations of news acquisition can arise
depending on the equilibrium thresholds n¯1 and n¯2; Figure 4 illustrates some of the possibilities.
Market order traders who acquire news in order to improve their estimate of the asset value focus on
less precise, more exclusive sources, while limit order traders focus on more precise, less exclusive
sources. This reflects the intuition discussed with Lemma 8. As earlier, the least precise news
sources may not be acquired at all, as in panels (a) and (c) of Figure 4. Also as earlier, more popular
news sources create price impacts that are disproportionate to the quality of their information, in
the sense that λn/τn rises with n.
The more novel possibility raised by Proposition 7 is that market order traders may treat the
source that is most incorporated into the price as a proxy for the price, and trade against it. For
these traders, news source N is valuable precisely because it is popular, as this makes it a good
bellwether of which way the price is likely to go, and its high precision is actually a disadvantage.
Furthermore, by selling on good news from N , these traders tend to depress its price impact,
making it possible for more limit order traders to acquire N and buy on good news. This means
that there may be a disproportionate volume of trade associated with source N , a subject that we
will turn to in the next section.
4.3 Complementary Clustering on News Source N
We refer to clustering by both types of trader at news source N as complementary because each
type tends to absorb the other’s trades, preventing the price impact of news from N from becoming
either unattractively high (for limit orders) or unattractively low (for market orders). The next
result shows that complementary clustering on source N will occur whenever public information
about the asset value is weak or when private information is strong.
Proposition 8 For τw suﬃciently small or for τx suﬃciently large, all market order traders ac-
quire source N and sell on good news.
While the proof is a bit involved, the intuition is quite direct. A market order trader who
already has accurate private information about the asset value has little to gain from acquiring
additional information about θ. He does better by acquiring additional information to help him
hedge against adverse price movements — he should try to buy less when the price is likely to be
undeservedly high (relative to θ), and more when it is undeservedly low. Because of its popularity
and large excess price impact, news source N is the best barometer of the direction the price will
move.
Alternatively, when there is a strong public consensus about the asset value (τw large), price
risk is mitigated, as a trader can weigh his private information xm against this consensus w. In
14The main issue has to do with the case in which both types acquire the threshold precision τ n¯2 . If there were
many identical sources at the threshold precision, then then the masses of limit and market traders at this threshold
precision could be distributed over these identical sources in many diﬀerent ways that are all essentially equivalent.
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this case, if his private information is only moderately precise, he may want to acquire relatively
exclusive news to supplement it. However, his price risk grows with increasing public uncertainty
about the asset (declining τw). If public beliefs become suﬃciently uncertain, he will begin to turn
to popular news sources to better gauge market sentiment.
To put a sharp focus on the implications of complementary clustering, we will look at the
extreme case in which public information is absent (τw = 0) and market order traders’ private
information is perfect (xm ≡ 0, so (τx)−1 = 0).
Example 3 : Two almost identical news sources
Suppose that there are two sources with τ1 = τ¯ and τ2 = τ¯ + ε. Set τw = (τx)−1 = 0
as discussed above, and consider limiting equilibria with ε → 0, so the two news sources are of
essentially identical quality. Our discussion will be kept intuitive, but all of the points could easily
be made more rigorous. Notice that as ε is taken to zero, the price impacts λ1 and λ2 of the two
sources must converge together, as a consequence of limit order indiﬀerence. Let λ¯ be the common,
limiting price impact. We can write the traders’ orders in the ε → 0 limit as q1l = β1y (y1 − p),
q2l = β2y (y2 − p), and q2m = α2y (θ − y2). However, because (τ1,λ1) and (τ2,λ2) converge together,
limit order strategies at the two sources will be identical: β1y = β2y. Furthermore there is no
ambiguity which source market order traders acquire, so we can simplify notation and simply write
the limiting orders as q1l = β (y1 − p), q2l = β (y2 − p), and qm = α (xm − y2).
Given these observations, we can work out how many limit order traders must acquire each
source. From (16), the equality of price impacts requires λ1 = ρLl1β = ρ (Ll2β −Mα) = λ2, so we
must have l1 = 12 − 12MαLβ and l2 = 12 + 12MαLβ . This is not a complete characterization — α and β are
endogenous quantities — but it gives the flavor of how news acquisition must look. The number of
excess limit order traders at source 2, Ll2 − Ll1 = Mαβ , depends on how much limit order demand
is required to soak up the market orders on the opposite side of the market. This excess rises the
more market order traders there are (M), or the more aggressively they trade relative to limit order
traders (α/β).
The expected volume of trade in this limiting equilibrium is
V ol =
1
2
E
¡
Ll1
¯¯
q1l
¯¯
+ Ll2
¯¯
q2l
¯¯
+M |qm|+ |z|
¢
We can partition this volume into gross trade associated with traders using each news source,
V ol1 = E
¡
Ll1
¯¯
q1l
¯¯¢
and V ol2 = E
¡
Ll2
¯¯
q2l
¯¯
+M |qm|
¢
, and gross noise trader volume V olz = |z|.
Notice that the expected size of a single limit order will not depend on which source is observed
— because y1 and y2 appear symmetrically in the price and in q1l and q
2
l , we will have E
¡¯¯
q1l
¯¯¢
=
E
¡¯¯
q2l
¯¯¢
. We will drop the subscript and write E (|ql|). Our focus will be on the ratio V ol2/V ol1,
which we will interpret as a measure of ‘abnormal’ trading volume generated by news from source
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Figure 5: Two identical news sources: Concentration on Source 2 vs. M . (Parameters: τ1 = τ2 = 1,
τw = τ−1x = 0, τ z = 1, L = γL = γM = 1. Left panel: fraction of limit order traders l2 and of
informed volume V ol2/ (V ol1 + V ol2) associated with Source 2. Right panel: total expected volume
V ol. )
2. We can write this ratio as15
V ol2
V ol1
=
l2
l1
+
M
Ll1
E (|qm|)
E (|ql|) =
l2
l1
+
M
Ll1
α
β
s
var (θ − y2)
var (y2 − p)
Figure 5 presents numerical results for the limiting equilibrium when τ1 = τ2 = 1. (For other
parameters, see the figure.) Holding the mass of limit order traders, we vary the mass of market
order traders from M = 0 up to M = 50, computing a new ε = 0 equilibrium at each step. When
market order traders are absent, the two news sources appear identical in terms of observable
outcome variables: half of the traders acquire each source (l2 = 12), and half of the ‘informed
volume of trade’ is associated with each source (V ol2/V ol1 = 1). As more and more market order
traders enter, both types find it mutually advantageous to cluster on source 2, l2 tends to one, and
the ratio V ol2/V ol1 of excess volume related to source 2 tends to infinity. To outside observers,
news from the two sources will appear to be of similar quality and to generate similar changes in
the price, but only news from source 2 will be accompanied by a spike in volume.
Example 4 : Varying the precision of public information
To illustrate the transition to the state of weak public information where Proposition 8 applies,
Figure 6 presents numerical results for a market with two news sources of quality τ1 = 1 and
τ2 = 1.1. We vary τw from 1 down to 0; other parameters are described in the figure. Initially,
for τw large, all market order traders acquire source 1 and buy on good news. At this point, the
trading volume associated with the two sources is similar. As τw falls below 0.5, there is a fairly
abrupt transition in which these traders all switch to source 2 and begin to sell on good news. At
the same point V ol1 and V ol2 diverge sharply.16 This transition is accomplished with almost no
15The last step follows from the fact that, unconditionally, ql and qm are both distributed normally with mean
zero. Then it is a standard result that E (|ql|) =
q
2
π var (ql) and similarly for qm.
16V ol1 and V ol2 are defined as above, but the expressions for E (|qnl |) and E (|qnm|) become a bit more complicated
than in Example 3. One must also remember that while, e.g., E
¡¯¯
q2m
¯¯¢
is the expected order size of a market order
trader holding signal y2, now variation in w and xm is responsible for some portion of that order.
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Figure 7: Excess volume at the top source. (N = 5 sources with precisions .25, .5, .75, 1, and 1.01.
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movement by limit order traders, roughly 58% of whom acquire source 2 throughout. The reason
is that from the standpoint of a limit order trader, the shift of market order traders from source 1
to 2 has two immediate eﬀects: there is new demand on the opposite side of the market at source
2, and there is less congestion on the same side of the market at source 1. These eﬀects make both
sources more attractive to limit order traders, and they happen to roughly balance. Both sources
have growing impacts on the price as public information deteriorates, but λ1 and λ2 rise smoothly
as τw declines, showing no evidence of the sharp transitions in market share and volume.
Example 5 : Abnormal volume at the most popular source
When there are many news sources, one can plot trend lines for the equilibrium price impact
and volume associated with a source of quality τ . Then one way to define excessive, or abnormal
volume associated with a news source would be to ask whether that source is an outlier from the
trend. To illustrate this idea, consider an example with five news sources. For the first four, set
τn = n4 , and let the last source be just slightly superior to source 4: τ5 = 1.01. Figure 7 shows the
equilibrium values of λn and V oln in an equilibrium with strong public information (τw = 1.5, left
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panel) and with weak public information (τw = 0.2, right panel). With strong public information,
market order traders focus on the lower quality sources, and price and volume impacts are roughly
linear in τ . In particular, the best two sources have almost identical price and volume impacts.
However, in the equilibrium with weak public information, most market order traders shift to selling
on good news from source 5, and as a result, V ol5 becomes an outlier.
5 Empirical Evidence
The model delivers several predictions that in principle could be tested. The main predictions
are: (1) higher quality news sources over-aﬀect the price relative to their precision, while news
from lower quality sources is under-incorporated or ignored altogether (in the short run); (2) new
information from top quality news sources may be associated with abnormal trading volume; (3)
eﬀect (2) should be more pronounced when public information is weak relative to privately held
information. As mentioned earlier, it is probably most natural to think of our static market as a
stylization of short run market clearing around the arrival of new information. If we indulge this
interpretation, and suppose that new information becomes eﬃciently incorporated into the price in
the longer run, then as a counterpart to (1) we can also suggest (4): price movements generated
by the most popular news sources will be prone to long run reversals. While the existing empirical
literature has not addressed these predictions directly, there is a certain amount of indirect evidence
which we survey below. One limitation in comparing this evidence to a static model is that natural
candidates for new signals from sources, such as analyst revisions or newsletters, are generally
studied as isolated events, not as an ensemble.
A common empirical approach involves identifying an information event, which could be an
earnings or insider trade announcement, an analyst or newsletter recommendation, a macroeco-
nomic surprise, or other news, and then studying an asset’s abnormal returns and volume in a
window around that event. In an influential series of papers, Kim and Verrecchia [24] [25] [26]
laid out a theoretical framework for the price and volume eﬀects of a public announcement. In
their models, an announcement generates trade both because traders diﬀer in the quality of their
pre-announcement private information (leading them to weight the news diﬀerently in their poste-
riors, which leads to trade) and because they interpret the announcement diﬀerently.17 The first
eﬀect generates a positive linear relationship between volume and the magnitude of price changes,
while the latter generates excess volume unrelated to the size of price changes. On this basis, it
has been suggested (see, for example, Bamber et al. [5]) to take residual volume, after controlling
for that portion explained by price changes, as a proxy for diﬀerential interpretations of the same
information. Our model suggests a diﬀerent explanation: excess volume can arise, as in Figure 7,
because traders are rationally using the same information to serve diﬀerent needs.
In data there is relatively strong evidence that firm-specific announcements generate abnormal
17These diﬀerential interpretations arise because traders have idiosyncratic private information about the error in
the announcement that only becomes useful when the announcement arrives. The operational eﬀect is similar to
Kandel and Pearson’s [23] assumption that traders interpret the same news with diﬀerent likelihood functions.
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volume.18 At the aggregate level, Mitchell and Mulherin [31] find that Dow Jones news announce-
ments are strongly correlated with aggregate market volume but relatively weakly related to the
sum of firms’ absolute price changes. For individual stocks, Kandel and Pearson [23], find ab-
normal volume in a window around earnings announcements, even after controlling for a positive
relationship with the magnitude of price changes in that window. They appeal to heterogeneous
interpretations of news to explain how an announcement could generate substantial volume relative
to a small price impact. Our model oﬀers a complementary explanation: it can be fully rational for
traders to use news in opposite ways due to diﬀerences in the ‘portfolios’ of other information they
have access to. In this case, prominent news can be a convenient coordination device for traders
who need to take opposite sides of the market. While it is outside our analysis in this paper, this
coordination issue may also shed light on Stice’s [33] puzzling finding that a Wall Street Journal
report about a firm’s 10-K or 10-Q filing sparks abnormal price and volume activity, even when
the filing was submitted (and made publicly available) several days earlier. Conceivably a delayed
response to news could be self supporting if traders who plan to respond in opposite ways wait
until a time when they expect the other side of the market to be deep.
To apply our model more directly to data, it would be advantageous to have some exogenous
proxy for a news source’s precision. In studies focused on analyst reports, a common criterion for
identifying top quality analysts is selection as an Institutional Investor All American (AA). Stickel
([34] and [35]) find evidence that AA analysts’ revisions generate larger (in magnitude) short run
abnormal returns than non-AA analysts’ revisions do, but that this excess impact tends to be
reversed in long run returns.19 This is loosely consistent with our predictions (1) and (4). Park
and Stice [32] apply Stickel’s approach using a diﬀerent quality measure based on an analyst’s past
forecasting accuracy relative to the I/B/E/S consensus. They also find that revisions by top quality
analysts generate significantly larger short run price impacts than revisions by other analysts. Their
results suggest that the relationship between an analyst’s percentile in the quality ranking and the
price impact of his revision is positive but relatively weak below the 80th percentile. However,
as an analyst rises above the 80th or 90th percentile, his price impact rises substantially. This is
similar to the convex relationship that we find between τn and λn (because λn/τn is increasing in
τn), although without knowing the cumulative distribution function for analyst precision we cannot
draw any firm conclusions.
A related paper by Loh and Stultz [29] provides some suggestive evidence for prediction (2).
Rather than look at the average response to an analyst’s revision as an outcome variable, they study
the probability that the revision generates a “large” response, as measured by abnormal returns
or volume exceeding pre-defined thresholds. Among the explanatory variables are the analyst’s
past forecast accuracy, a continuous measure of quality, and AA status, which could be interpreted
18See, for example, Bamber [4] for earnings announcements, or Womack [41] for brokerage recommendations.
19 In recent work, Fang and Yasuda [10] find that portfolios formed by following AA analyst buy recommendations
(but not sell recommendations) do earn short run excess returns, but that these excess returns are not reversed in the
long run. However, given the portfolio methodology, it is diﬃcult to draw conclusions about long run price impacts
for any single stock.
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as an indicator variable singling out the right tail of the analyst quality distribution. Even after
controlling for forecast accuracy, AA analysts’ revisions are substantially more likely to have large
impacts on both price and volume.
Finally, in one strand of work that touches on prediction (3), dispersion of analysts’ recommen-
dations is used to proxy for the absence of a strong consensus belief among investors. In a typical
result, Atiase and Bamber [3] find that analyst dispersion is associated with higher trading vol-
ume around earnings announcements. One possible explanation, as with the Kandel and Pearson
findings, is that traders interpret the same signal diﬀerently. Our model oﬀers the complementary
possibility that analyst dispersion is associated with periods when market order traders face sub-
stantial price risk, making it particularly important for them to closely monitor (and trade on)
news that is expected to move the price.
6 Concluding Remarks
We show that if there are many potential sources of information about an asset but a trader must
focus on one of them to use its information profitably, then most traders may concentrate on a
few precise and popular sources, leaving other information under-utilized. Furthermore, diﬀerences
in baseline information — in our case, market order traders who give up conditioning on the price
in order to exploit additional private information — can motivate rational traders to focus on the
same news but respond to it in opposite ways. Together, these eﬀects can explain why one signal
may generate substantial price movement and trading volume, while another signal of apparently
similar quality does not. Below we comment on the robustness of these conclusions and suggest a
few extensions.
By restricting traders to one source, we have implicitly assumed that there is a capacity limit
on how much information a trader can acquire, absorb, and profit from before it becomes stale —
this amounts to a highly convex cost of information. If this limit were relaxed so that a trader
could follow more than one news source, we would expect concentration to be less extreme, but
the results should be qualitatively similar. A capacity limit may be reasonable if inelastic time and
attention are important components of the cost of information, but there is probably a degree to
which both time and attention can be multiplied with additional cash. Thus it would be useful to
know how our results would change if a trader can acquire more signals, or higher quality signals,
by spending more money.
Of course, signal costs rising with precision might emerge endogenously if news sources set
prices for their information. In a setting with a monopolist information provider, Admati and
Pfleiderer [1] have shown that profit maximization aﬀects how information will be packaged for
buyers (in some cases with extra noise added), thus making the set of available signals endogenous.
Less is known about oligopoly competition among information providers. In our model, if one is
willing to take the news source precisions as given, it is straightforward to append a first stage with
price competition among news sources. One loses the simple geometric representation of traders’
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indiﬀerence curves, but the model can still be solved computationally.20 One would expect price
competition to lead to less concentration by traders, since popular sources will charge relatively
higher prices. Examples suggest that this is correct, but concentration is not wiped out. Moreover,
if the market order - limit order complementarity gives a news source a disproportionately large
market share, this does not mean that it has substantial market power. If it has a close competitor
on the characteristics that matter to traders, precision and price impact, then if it charges too much,
the excess market share will switch en masse to the competitor.21 It appears that competition for
this bloc of traders can keep information prices fairly competitive.
While a static model is useful for examining how eﬃciently the market aggregates dispersed
information, the conceit that news sources release new signals at the same time is stylized. Within
the scope of the model, one could make this more realistic by, for example, assuming that each
news source fails to deliver a signal with some probability. However, ultimately it would make
sense to study which news sources traders choose to follow in a dynamic model. A dynamic model
could also allow traders’ order types to emerge endogenously, which might yield interesting insights.
Finally, an alternative to our assumption that the market clears without intermediation would be
to introduce a market-maker who sets a competitive price conditional on the order flow as in Kyle
[27]. If this market-maker can acquire additional information, then one can show that he and the
market order traders may have incentives to coordinate on the same information, for reasons that
are similar to the complementarity between market and limit order traders in our model.22
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2
Any solution to f (τ ,λ) = K must also satisfy Qf (τ ,λ) = QK where Q = τ ¡sp − λ2w/τw − λ2/τ¢. With
algebra, Qf (τ ,λ)−QK = 0 can be written as the quadratic form [τ λ 1] Z [τ λ 1]0 = 0, where
Z =
⎡
⎣
sp − λ2w/τw − (1− λw) − 12 (K − f0)
¡
sp − λ2w/τw
¢
− (1− λw) K 0−12 (K − f0)
¡
sp − λ2w/τw
¢
0 0
⎤
⎦
This quadratic form is an ellipse if |Z| 6= 0, |Z33| > 0 (where Z33 is the leading principal minor), and
the diagonal entries of Z33 do not have the same sign as |Z|. Checking these conditions, we have |Z| =
−14K (K − f0)
³
sp − λ2wτw
´2
< 0, |Z33| =
¡
sp − λ2w/τw
¢ ³
K − (1−λw)2
sp−λ2w/τw
´
=
¡
sp − λ2w/τw
¢
(K − f0) > 0, and
the diagonal entries of Z33 are positive.
The fact that A, B, C, and D lie on this ellipse and the vertical tangencies at A and C are easy to check
directly. Note that the same points A and B lie on every ellipse in the family Qf (τ ,λ) = QK indexed by
K, but as singularities of f , they do not belong to the level curve f (τ ,λ) = K for any K > f0. The sign
of f (τ ,λ)−K must be constant over the interior or exterior of ellipse Qf (τ ,λ) = QK; to confirm that this
sign is negative on the interior and positive on the exterior, check the value of f at the midpoint of AB and
at (τ , 0) for τ large.
Proof of Proposition 2
Let λNinf be the price impact of one of the inferior sources in an equilibrium with N sources. (Indiﬀerence
requires that all N − 1 of these sources have the same price impact.) Let lNinf be the fraction of traders who
acquire each inferior source. We have λNinf ≥ 0, λNsup ≥ 0, and (N − 1)λNinf + λNsup ≤ 1, so we must have
limN→∞ λNinf = 0. A similar argument applies to lNinf .
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For the superior source, first note that we can bound ρ above and below, uniformly in N : 0 < ρ ≤
ρ ≤ ρ¯ < ∞. (See the proof of Proposition 6.) Next, fix an equilibrium with N sources. We either have
lNsup = 1 or l
N
sup < 1. In the former case, only the superior source is acquired; working through (11) we find
λNsup = τ¯+ε(τ¯+ε)+τw . Alternatively, suppose that lNsup < 1, so inferior sources are acquired. Then indiﬀerence
requires f
³
τ¯ ,λNinf
´
= f
³
τ¯ + ε,λNsup
´
. Let ∆ be the slope of this indiﬀerence curve where it crosses the λ = 0
axis. Convexity of the indiﬀerence curve then implies that λNsup ≥ λNinf +∆ε. From the proof of Lemma 8
we have ∆ = 12 s
N
p −(λNw )2/τw
1−λw ≥
ρ2
2τz , so λNsup ≥ λNinf +
ρ2
2τz ε ≥
ρ2
2τz ε. Then applying (11), and using ρ ≤ ρ¯
and βsupy ≤ γL (τ¯ + ε), we have lNinf ≥ λ
N
sup
LγLρ¯(τ¯+ε) ≥
ρ2
2LγLρ¯τz(τ¯+ε)ε. To summarize, in any equilibrium with
N sources, we have λNsup ≥ min
³
τ¯+ε
(τ¯+ε)+τw ,
ρ2
2τz ε
´
and lNsup ≥ min
³
1,
ρ2
2LγLρ¯τz(τ¯+ε)ε
´
. Thus λNsup and lNsup are
bounded away from zero uniformly in N , as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider a prospective equilibrium in which all traders acquire N . If we set aside the ex ante utility
maximization condition for the moment, by standard results we can find an order strategy
³
βNy ,βwy
´
for
traders and a price function P that are mutually consistent (in the sense that
³
βNy ,βwy
´
is interim optimal
with respect to the P , and the P is generated by
³
βNy ,βwy
´
). If in addition to this, no trader would prefer
to deviate by acquiring some other source instead, then
n
lN = 1,
³
βNy ,βwy
´
, P
o
is an equilibrium. Because
unacquired sources will have identical price impacts λ1 = ... = λN−1 = 0 in this prospective equilibrium, it
will suﬃce to check for deviations to the next most precise source, N − 1.
Next consider a few facts about the prospective equilibrium. It is straightforward to show that λN+λw =
1. Because the price provides no additional information after controlling for yn and w, the posterior precision
of a trader’s estimate of θ is just τˆNl = τN + τw. For the order strategy, we have (consulting (7) and
(8)) βNy = γLτN and βNw = γLτw, so by (11) we have λN = τN/ (τN + τw), λw = τw/ (τN + τw), and
ρ−1 = LγL (τN + τw). The variance of the price will be sp = λ2N/τN + λ2w/τw + ρ2/τz.
Now turn to a potential deviation to source N − 1. Using λN−1 = 0, (9), and the results above, we have
τˆN−1l = τN−1 + τw + λ
2
N
sp − λ2w/τw
= τN−1 + τw + 1
1
τN +
1
τz
³ ρ
λN
´2
The condition that rules out a deviation to N − 1 is τˆNl ≥ τˆN−1l , or, using ρ/λN = 1/ (LγLτN ):
τN − τN−1 ≥
Ã
1
τN +
1
τz
1
(LγLτN)2
!−1
With rearranging, this condition becomes: (τN − τN−1) (1−D) ≥ DτN−1. The condition cannot hold if
D ≥ 1, since we have τN > τN−1. In this case, there cannot be an all-N equilibrium. If D < 1, then
the prospective equilibrium is valid if τN − τN−1 ≥ τN−1D/ (1−D). Note that no part of this argument
depends on the number of signals N .
Proof of Proposition 4
The style is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. For each market N , let nN1 be the worst signal that
is acquired in equilibrium. We will use the constraint that
PN
nN1
λn ≤ 1 to show that the fraction of signals
acquired, N−n
N
1
N , shrinks like
1√
N
as N grows. Follow the proof of Proposition 2 to show
λNn ≥ λNn − λNnN1 ≥
ρ2
2τz
³
τn − τnN1
´
=
ρ2
2τz
µ
Ψ−1( n
N
)−Ψ−1(n
N
1
N
)
¶
for all n ∈ {nN1 , ..., N}. Let C be a Lipschitz constant for Ψ, so that we have Ψ−1(b)−Ψ−1(a) ≥ 1C |b− a|
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for all a, b ∈ [τL, τH ]. Thus we have λNn ≥ ρ
2
2τzCN
¡
n− nN1
¢
. Adding up over all acquired signals, we have
PN
nN1
λn ≥ ρ
2
2τzCN
PN
nN1
¡
n− nN1
¢
=
ρ2
4τzCN d
N (dN − 1)
where dN = N − nN1 + 1 is the number of acquired signals. Applying PNnN1 λn ≤ 1, we have¡
dN
¢2
N
≤ 4τzCρ2 + 1
so dN grows no faster than
√
N with the total number of signals. Thus, dN/N → 0 and the total precision
of all the information acquired by traders is bounded above by τHdN , proving the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5
We prove the risk tolerance case; the argument for τz →∞ is essentially the same. Consider a sequence
{(γL)k}k≥1 → ∞, and for each risk tolerance level in the sequence, fix an equilibrium. We write (rn)k =
(λn)k /τn and (rw)k = (λw)k /τw, and let n¯k be the lowest numbered source that is acquired in equilibrium.
Henceforth we drop the subscripts k to avoid clutter. Note that with rearranging we can write
Bn ≡ βny/γL = τn
ρ2/τz +Pn0 6=n (rn0 − rn) rn0τn0
ρ2/τz +Pn0 6=n r2n0τn0 and Bnw ≡ βnw/γL = τw ρ
2/τz +Pn0 6=n (rn0 − rw) rn0τn0
ρ2/τz +Pn0 6=n r2n0τn0
Claim 1 γL →∞ implies ρ2/τz → 0.
Equilibrium Bn and Bnw are weakly positive for all n. Furthermore, because rn is weakly increasing in
n, we have Bn¯ ≥ τ n¯ ¡ρ2/τz¢ ³ρ2/τz +Pn0 6=n r2n0τn0´−1. Suppose toward a contradiction that ρ2/τz 9 0.
Then Bn¯ must be bounded away from zero, but then (11) and γL →∞ imply that ρ2/τz → 0.
Claim 2 ρ2/τz → 0 implies rn − rn0 → 0, Bn → 0, and Bn0 → 0 for all n, n0 such that limγL→∞ rn > 0 and
limγL→∞ rn0 > 0.
Consider the numerator of BN . Because rn is weakly increasing in n, we have
P
n0 6=N (rn0 − rN ) rn0τn0 =
−Pn0 6=N |rN − rn0 | rn0τn0 ≤ 0. Thus, because BN ≥ 0, we havePn0 6=N |rN − rn0 | rn0τn0 ≤ ρ2/τz. But then,
for any n0 such that limγL→∞ rn0 > 0, we must have rN − rn0 → 0. The first claim follows. Then in the
numerator of Bn, each term in the sum satisfies (rn0 − rn) rn0 → 0, so we have Bn → 0.
Claim 3 rN − rw → 0
Write the numerator of Bnw as ρ2/τz +Pn0 6=n (rn0 − rN ) rn0τn0 +Pn0 6=n (rN − rw) rn0τn0 . Then because
the first two terms tend to 0, the weak positivity of Bnw implies that limγL→∞ (rN − rw) ≥ 0. Suppose
toward a contradiction that limγL→∞ (rN − rw) > 0. This would imply Bnw eventually strictly positive
and bounded away from 0, and therefore, by Claim 2, that BN/BNw → 0. However, from (11) we have
rN/rw ≤ τNτw B
N
BNw
→ 0, a contradiction. Thus, limγL→∞ (rN − rw) > 0.
Claim 4 Suppose limγL→∞ n¯ = n¯∞, and let τp =
PN
n=n¯∞ τn + τw. The coeﬃcients of the equilibrium price
function satisfy λw → τw/τp and λn →
n τn/τp if n ≥ n¯∞
0 if n < n¯∞ .
This follows from the earlier claims and the adding up constraint
PN
n=1 λn + τw = 1.
Claim 5 n¯→ 1 (All sources are acquired.)
Suppose toward a contradiction that limγL→∞ n¯ = n¯∞ > 1. The limiting price function is suﬃcient for{yn¯∞ , yn¯∞+1, ..., yN , τw}, so the posterior precision of a trader choosing source n¯∞ or higher tends to τp. But
then the posterior precision of a trader who chose source 1 and observed {y1, w, p} would tend to τ1 + τp,
so source 1 must be observed in the limit after all.
Proof of Lemma 7
Let g¯ = g(τn,λn), so the curve of interest is g(τ ,λ) = g¯ > g0. We proceed just as for Lemma 2.
Let Q˜ = τ (τ + τw + τx) and clear denominators, noting that any solution to g(τ ,λ) = g¯ must also solve
Q˜ (g(τ ,λ)− g¯) = 0. This last equation can be written as the quadratic form [τ λ 1] Z˜ [τ λ 1]0 = 0, where
Z˜ =
⎡
⎣
g¯ λw 12
¡
g¯ (τw + τx) + λ2w
¢
λw − (τw + τx) 0
1
2
¡
g¯ (τw + τx) + λ2w
¢
0 0
⎤
⎦
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To show this curve is a hyperbola, it suﬃces to show
¯¯¯
Z˜
¯¯¯
6= 0 and
¯¯¯
Z˜33
¯¯¯
< 0. We have
¯¯¯
Z˜
¯¯¯
= 14 (τw + τx)2
³
g¯ +
λ2wτw+τx
´2
=
1
4 (τw + τx)2 (g¯ − g0)2 > 0, and
¯¯¯
Z˜33
¯¯¯
= −g¯ (τw + τx) − λ2w = − (τw + τx) (g¯ − g0) < 0. The tangency at
(0, 0) is an easy application of the implicit function theorem, and the ranking of indiﬀerence curves is
straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 6
We overload notation by writing ~P = (λ1, ...,λN ,λw,λθ, ρ) for a vector of price coeﬃcients. Let D =
Dl×Dm×DP ⊂ R3N+3 be a compact set that we will define presently. Let Γ = (Γl,Γm,ΓP ) : D→→ R3N+3
be a correspondence over triples of vectors
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
. Intuitively, we will have ΓP
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
return the price
function that would arise if traders respond optimally to
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
, and Γl
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
and Γm
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
return
the sets of market shares ~l and ~m that are consistent with optimal news choice with respect to ~P . Then we
will prove that Γ has a fixed point.
Formally, define ΓP = (Γλ1 , ...,ΓλN ,Γλw ,Γλθ ,Γρ) : D→→ RN+3 as follows. Given an input
³
~l0, ~m0, ~P0
´
,
let
³
~β1, ~α1
´
be the order strategies induced by ~P0 according to (3) and (7), (8), (12), and (13). Let
Γρ
³
~l0, ~m0, ~P0
´
be the ρ price coeﬃcient induced, according to (16), by market shares
³
~l0, ~m0
´
and order
strategies
³
~β1, ~α1
´
. Similarly, let Γλw
³
~l0, ~m0, ~P0
´
be the price coeﬃcient induced on w, and Γλn
³
~l0, ~m0, ~P0
´
the price coeﬃcient induced on source n, according to (16), by market shares
³
~l0, ~m0
´
and order strategies³
~β1, ~α1
´
. Finally, let Γλθ
³
~l0, ~m0, ~P0
´
= 1 − Γλw
³
~l0, ~m0, ~P0
´
−PNn=1 Γλn ³~l0, ~m0, ~P0´ be the residual. In
passing, notice that ΓP is a function.
Next, the market shares. For brevity let us write ~P1 = ΓP
³
~l0, ~m0, ~P0
´
for the new price function
generated from
³
~l0, ~m0, ~P0
´
. Let fn = f (τn,λn)|~P1 and gn = g (τn,λn)|~P1 be the values of source n to
limit and market order traders respectively when evaluated according to ~P1. Let f¯ = maxn∈{1,...,N} fn and
g¯ = maxn∈{1,...,N} gn. Now let Γl
³
~l0, ~m0, ~P0
´
=
n
~l ∈ ∆N | ¡f¯ − fn¢ ln = 0 ∀no. In other words, take the
set of all distributions over news sources that put zero weight on strictly suboptimal sources. Similarly, set
Γm
³
~l0, ~m0, ~P0
´
= {~m ∈ ∆N | (g¯ − gn)mn = 0 ∀n}.
The domains for~l and ~m are straightforward; setDl = Dm = ∆N . For ~P , setDP = ∆N+2×£ρ, ρ¯¤. Notice
that any ~P ∈ DP satisfies λw ∈ [0, 1], a relaxed version of A2, as well as λn ≥ 0 and 1− λw −PNn=1 λn ≥ 0.
The bounds ρ and ρ¯ are defined by ρ−1 = LγL (τw + τN ) and ρ¯−1 = r¯, where r¯ is the positive solution to the
quadratic equation r = LγL
¡τw + τ1 − τzr2¢. (To confirm that ρ < ρ¯, note that ρ−1 > LγL (τw + τ1) >
ρ¯−1.)
Now we can introduce a version of the Browder fixed point theorem due to Border [6].
Theorem 1 Let D ⊂ Rk be compact and convex and let Γ : D →→ Rk be an upper hemicontinuous
correspondence with non-empty closed convex values. Define ∂D to be the boundary of D. If for every point
d ∈ ∂D, there exists some d0 ∈ Γ(d) and some κ > 0 such that (1− κ)d+ κd0 ∈ D, then Γ has a fixed point
in D.
Loosely, this says that if the “gradient set” Γ(d) − d has an element that points into D at every point
on D’s surface, then there must be a point within D at which some member of the set Γ(d)− d is equal to
zero. To apply the theorem to Γ, note that ΓP is a continuous function (and so its values are trivially closed
and convex). Furthermore, the values of Γl constitute a simplex ∆n˜ ⊆ ∆N , where 1 ≤ n˜ ≤ N is the number
of ex ante optimal sources, so these values are also closed, convex, and non-empty. Γl is defined by weak
inequalities on the “quasi-utilities” fn, which are continuous functions of ~P , so Γl is uhc. (And similarly forΓm.)
Next note that we do not need to worry about the boundary condition for Γl and Γm because Γl
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
⊆
Dl and Γm
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
⊆ Dm by construction. Then, because ΓP is a function, it will suﬃce to that for all
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³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
∈ ∂D, there is some κ > 0 such that (1 − κ)~P + κΓP
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
∈ DP . Note that ∂D is defined
by the linear constraints λn ≥ 0, λw ≥ 0, λθ ≥ 0, and ρ ≤ ρ ≤ ρ¯. We start by considering boundary points
where exactly one of these constraints binds and the others are slack. For these cases, it suﬃces to show
that the binding constraint is satisfied at ΓP
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
, since κ may be chosen small enough that none of the
constraints that are slack at ~P become violated at (1− κ)~P + κΓP
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
.
λn = 0, other constraints are slack.
Suppose that λn = 0 in the vector ~P . Then by (12) and (7), ~P generates order strategies of αny =γM
snm
τnτx+τn+τw λw ≥ 0 and βny = γLτn > 0 at source n. With (16) and mn ≥ 0 and ln ≥ 0, this implies that
Γλn
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
≥ 0.
λw = 0, other constraints are slack.
Suppose that λw = 0 in the vector ~P . Then (13) and (8) imply that ~P generates order strategies of
αnw = γMsnm τwτx+τn+τw λn ≥ 0 and βnw = γLτw > 0 for all n. Consulting (16), we have Γλw
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
> 0.
λθ = 1− λw −PNn=1 λn = 0, other constraints are slack.
Suppose this is true at ~P . Note that we can write (16) as λθ = ρMPNn=1mnαnx . By (14), ~P generates
the order strategy αnx = γMsnm τxτx+τn+τw (λn + λw) ≥ 0 for each n, so with mn ≥ 0 we have Γλθ
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
≥ 0.
ρ = ρ, other constraints are slack.
By (7) and (8), ~P generates order strategies satisfying βny ≤ γLτn and βnw ≤ γLτw for all n. Then using
(16) we have
³
Γρ
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´´−1 ≤ LγL ³τw +PNn=1 lnτn´ ≤ LγL (τw + τN ), so we have Γρ ³~l, ~m, ~P´ ≥ ρ.
ρ = ρ¯, other constraints are slack.
By (7) and (8), ~P generates order strategies satisfying
βny + βnw = γL(τn + τw)− γL (λn + λw)(1− λw − λn)P
n0 6=n λ2n0/τn0 + ρ¯2/τz
> γL(τ1 + τw)− γLτz
µ
1
ρ¯
¶2
Thus, using (16) we have
³
Γρ
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´´−1 ≥ LγL ³τ1 + τw − τz (1/ρ¯)2´ = 1/ρ¯. Thus Γρ ³~l, ~m, ~P´ ≤ ρ¯.
From these arguments, it is straightforward to see that if some combination of these constraints binds at
~P , while others are slack, then ΓP
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
satisfies all the conditions binding at ~P , so by taking κ > 0 small
enough, we have (1−κ)~P +κΓP
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
∈ DP for all
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
∈ ∂D. Applying the theorem, we conclude
that Γ has a fixed point in D. Note that A1, which amounts to ρ > 0, is satisfied by construction. Also by
construction, we have λw ∈ [0, 1], but for A2 we need to show that λw = 0 and λw = 1 cannot be part of a
fixed point. First consider some price function ~P with λw = 1. This implies λθ = 0 and λn = 0 for all n, so in
particular,
PN
n=1 λn = 0. But then (following the argument for the λn case above) ~P would generate order
strategies satisfying αny ≥ 0 and βny > 0 for all n. But this, using (16), would implyPNn=1 Γλn ³~l, ~m, ~P´ > 0,
so ~P cannot be part of a fixed point. Next consider a price function ~P with λw = 0. Then the argument
above for the λw = 0 constraint applies directly: Γλw
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
> 0, so ~P cannot be part of a fixed point.
Thus there exists an equilibrium satisfying A2 as well. The condition that λn ≤ 1 − λw is implied by the
constraints that λn = 1− λw − λθ −Pn0 6=n λn0 and the positivity of λw, λθ, and λn0 . Finally, for the strict
positivity of λn if n is acquired, use ln +mn > 0 and λw > 0 in the argument for the λn = 0 constraint, to
show that Γλn
³
~l, ~m, ~P
´
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 8
Families of indiﬀerence curves are completely characterized by the equilibrium values of sp and λw and
the precisions τw and τx. We will show, a fortiori, that for any point ¡τ¯ , λ¯¢ with 0 ≤ λ¯ ≤ 1− λw, the limit
order indiﬀerence curve through ¡τ¯ , λ¯¢ is steeper than the market order indiﬀerence curve at that point, if a
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Figure 8: Relative slopes of limit and market order indiﬀerence curves
limit order trader would buy on good news at a (hypothetical) signal
¡τ¯ , λ¯¢. First we show that the lemma
holds on the λ = 0 axis, then we will extend to λ > 0. For a point (τ¯ , 0), and for the indiﬀerence curves
g(τ ,λ) = g(τ¯ , 0) and f(τ ,λ) = f(τ¯ , 0), by direct computation we have
dλ
dτ
¯¯¯¯
MO
= −∂g/∂τ∂g/∂λ
¯¯¯¯
(τ ,0)
=
1
2
λw
τx + τw + τ¯ and
dλ
dτ
¯¯¯¯
LO
= −∂f/∂τ∂f/∂λ
¯¯¯¯
(τ ,0)
=
1
2
sp − λ2w/τw
1− λw
But then A3 and the positivity of τx and τ¯ imply dλdτ
¯¯
LO
> dλdτ
¯¯
MO
as claimed.
For (τ¯ , λ¯) with λ¯ > 0, first observe that the conditions λ¯ ≤ 1− λw and that a limit order trader would
buy on good news at (τ¯ , λ¯) imply that (τ¯ , λ¯) lies on the increasing, convex CD portion of a limit order
indiﬀerence curve as in Figure 1.
Case 1: (τ¯ , λ¯) is on the upper branch of g(τ ,λ) = g(τ¯ , λ¯).
Refer to the left panel of Figure 8 where (τ¯ , λ¯) is labeled point E. Let M(τ) denote the upper branch
of g(τ ,λ) = g(τ¯ , λ¯) and let L(τ) denote that portion of f(τ ,λ) = f(τ¯ , λ¯) that lies along the arc ADC,
where A = (0, 0), D = (τD, 0) is defined by f (τD, 0) = f(τ¯ , λ¯), and C = (τC , 1− λw) is defined by
f (τC , 1− λw) = f(τ¯ , λ¯). Note that M (τ) is concave and L (τ) is convex. Furthermore, because of the
vertical tangency at (0, 0), we have M(τ) > L(τ) for small τ . Thus, M(τ)−L(τ) crosses zero at most once,
and only from above, and so we must have M 0 (τ¯) < L0 (τ¯).
Case 2: (τ¯ , λ¯) is on the lower branch of g(τ ,λ) = g(τ¯ , λ¯).
Refer to the right panel of Figure 8. E = (τ¯ , λ¯) is labeled as in Case 1, as are D, C, and and the
limit order indiﬀerence curve through E = ¡τ¯ , λ¯¢, L (τ). Let M¯ (τ) be the lower branch of the market order
indiﬀerence curve through point D. The market order indiﬀerence curve through (τ¯ , λ¯) is not pictured. Note
that by condition A3 and the results above for the λ¯ = 0 case, at point D we have L0 (τˆ) | > M¯ 0 (τˆ) as
depicted. Now consider the market order indiﬀerence curve g(τ ,λ) = g(τ¯ , λ¯). The hyperbola that it lies on
intersects the ellipse that L (τ) lies on at points E and A, with a tangency at the latter. Suppose toward a
contradiction that g(τ ,λ) = g(τ¯ , λ¯) is steeper than L (τ) at point E, as suggested in the “candidate” curve
represented by the dashed line. This implies that the market order indiﬀerence curve crosses into the interior
of the ellipse at E. But then it must cross the ellipse twice more, as pictured — once because the hyperbola
must exit the ellipse as τ and λ tend to infinity, and once more because the hyperbola must connect E
to A without crossing indiﬀerence curve M¯ (τ). Thus, there must be at least four points of intersection
for the ellipse and hyperbola that f(τ ,λ) = f(τ¯ , λ¯) and g(τ ,λ) = g(τ¯ , λ¯) lie on respectively, including one
point of tangency. But this is impossible, as an ellipse and a hyperbola can intersect at most three times,
if one of those intersections is a tangency. Nor can the two indiﬀerence curves be tangent at E; if they
were, we would be able to find a slightly perturbed point E˜ along g(τ ,λ) = g(τ¯ , λ¯), with corresponding limit
order indiﬀerence curve L˜ (τ), for which the contradictory four intersections reemerges. Thus the limit order
indiﬀerence curve must be strictly steeper than the market order indiﬀerence curve at E.
Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose that in equilibrium, sources acquired by limit order traders lie on the curve f (τ ,λ) = f¯ , while
sources acquired by market order traders lie on g (τ ,λ) = g¯. For market order traders, let λLBMO(τ) and
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λUBMO(τ) denote the lower and upper branches of the hyperbola g (τ ,λ) = g¯. The equilibrium condition
0 ≤ λn ≤ 1− λw and Lemma 9 imply that if limit order traders acquire n, then (τn,λn) lies along the DC
arc of f (τ ,λ) = f¯ (as designated in Figure 1). With this in mind, let λLBLO(τ) denote the portion of this
ellipse lying along ADC. We will proceed through a series of claims.
Claim 1 If for some n, mn > 0 and market order traders sell on good news at n, then ln > 0 and limit order
traders buy on good news at n.
Proof A1, positivity of λn by Proposition 6, and (16) imply that Mmnαny +Llnβny ≥ 0, so if mnαny < 0,
then lnβny > 0.
Claim 2 There is at most one source n0 such that mn0 > 0 and ln0 > 0 and both types buy on good news.
Proof Suppose both types acquire both n0 and n00 > n0 and buy on good news. Define the continuous
function δ (τ) = λLBMO(τ) − λLBLO(τ). We have δ (τn0) = δ (τn00) = 0 and by Lemma 8, δ0 (τn0) and δ0 (τn00)
both strictly negative. Then there must be some τ∗ ∈ [τn0 , τn00 ] such that δ (τ∗) = 0 and δ0 (τ∗) ≥ 0. Let
λ∗ = λLBMO(τ∗) = λLBLO(τ∗). But then (τ∗,λ∗) lies on both indiﬀerence curves with λLBMO weakly steeper than
λLBLO at (τ∗,λ∗), a contradiction of Lemma 8.
Claim 3 If mnm > 0 and lnl > 0 for distinct nm and nl, and market order traders buy on good news at
ynm , then nm < nl.
Proof Suppose instead that nm > nl. Then we have λLBMO(τnm) = λnm and λLBLO(τnl) = λnl , with
λnm > 0 and λnl > 0 by Proposition 6, and τnl < τnm . Furthermore, we must have λnl ≥ λLBMO(τnl) (or
else MO traders would strictly prefer to buy on good news at nl instead) and λnm ≥ λLBLO(τnm) (or else LO
traders would strictly prefer to acquire nm instead). Define δ (τ) as in Claim 2 and observe that the last two
inequalities imply δ (τnl) ≤ 0 and δ (τnm) ≥ 0. Then there must be some τ∗ ∈ [τnl , τnm ] such that δ (τ∗) = 0
and δ0 (τ∗) ≥ 0. Let λ∗ = λLBMO(τ∗) = λLBLO(τ∗) > 0. But then (τ∗,λ∗) lies on both indiﬀerence curves, with
the market order indiﬀerence curve weakly steeper at (τ∗,λ∗), a contradiction of Lemma 8. Thus nm < nl.
Claim 4 Let n¯1 be the least precise source acquired by any trader. If n¯1 < N , then every source between
n¯1 and N is also acquired by some trader.
Proof One of the order types must buy on good news at n¯1. (If ln¯1 > 0, then βn¯1y > 0 by Lemma 9. If
ln¯1 = 0 and mn¯1 > 0, then αn¯1y > 0 by Claim 1.) Suppose there were some n0 > n¯1 that was not acquired
by any trader. But then we would have τn0 > τ n¯1 and λn0 = 0 ≤ λn¯1 , so the order type that buys on good
news at n¯1 could do strictly better by switching to the more precise, more exclusive source n0.
Claim 5 If market order traders acquire and sell on good news at a source yn, then n = N .
Proof Suppose that market order traders sell on good news at some yn0 with n0 < N . By Claim 1,
Ln0 > 0 and (τn0 ,λn0) must be an intersection of λUBMO(τ) and λLBLO(τ). Since the former is concave and the
latter is convex, there is at most one such intersection, so market order traders do not sell on good news at
any other source. Furthermore, Claims 3 and 4 imply LN > 0. (Claim 4 implies either LN > 0 or MN > 0.
If the latter, then market order traders would have to buy on good news at yN but then Claim 3 applies.)
But by the same convexity-concavity argument, this means that (τN ,λLBLO(τN )) lies above λUBMO(·), so market
order traders would prefer to acquire yN instead.
Claims 2, 3, and 4 imply parts i-iv of the proposition. Claim 5 implies part v. Parts i-v imply that
λn+1−λn equals either λLBMO(τn+1)−λLBMO(τn), λLBLO(τn+1)−λLBLO(τn), or λLBLO(τn+1)−λLBMO(τn) for n ≥ n¯1.
In the first two cases, the fact that λLBMO(·) and λLBLO(·) are increasing functions (where they are positive)
suﬃces to show {λn} increasing. The third case only applies if market order traders acquire yn but do not
acquire yn+1 in which case their weak preference for yn implies λLBLO(τn+1) ≥ λLBMO(τn+1), and this together
with λLBMO(·) suﬃces. The result that {λn/τn} is increasing follows by a similar argument from the convexity
of λLBMO(·) and λLBLO(·) and the fact that both approach the origin as τ → 0.
The following lemmas are used in proving Proposition 8.
Lemma 10 If A3 holds and for some source n, λn/τn < λw/τw, then βnw > 0.
Proof. βnw strictly positive is equivalent to
λw
τw <
sp − λ2w/τw − λ2n/τn
1− λw − λn
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Clearing denominators (note that 1− λw − λn > 0) and simplifying, this is equivalent to
λw
τw < sp + λn
µλw
τw −
λn
τn
¶
But λw/τw < sp by A3, so the inequality holds.
Lemma 11 (Lower bound on the total price impact of news sources and w) In equilibrium, λw+PNn=1 λn =
1− λθ > ε¯ > 0, where ε¯ = 12LMγLγMτz(τN+τw)+1 .
Proof. Write V = λw + PNn=1 λn. Using (11), we have V = 1 − ρPNn=1Mmnαnx , where αnx =γM
snm
(λn + λw) τxtnm ≥ 0. Using expressions for snm and sp, we have snm ≥ ρ2/τz. Furthermore τx/tnm =
τx/ (τx + τw + τn) < 1, so we have αnx ≤ γMτzρ2 (λn+λw). Finally, let ρ = (LγL (τN + τw))−1 and note thatρ ≥ ρ. Combining these, we have
V ≥ 1− MγMτzρ
NX
n=1
mn(λn + λw). (18)
Now suppose that V < ε, for some ε > 0. A fortiori, we have λw < ε and λn < ε for all n. Then by
(18) we have ε > V ≥ 1 − 2MγMτzρ ε. But this is impossible for ε ≤ ε¯ = ρ2MγMτz+ρ . We conclude that
V >
ρ
2MγMτz+ρ > 0. Expand ρ to get the result.
Lemma 12 If A3 holds in equilibrium, then the following are true: (i)
PN
n=1
λnτn ≥ λwτw , and (ii) λNτN ≥ 1N λwτw .
Proof. Part (ii) follows from part (i) and λn/τn increasing in n. For part (i), observe that if λN/τN ≥λw/τw, then the claim holds trivially, so assume λN/τN < λw/τw. Then we must have λn/τn < λw/τw for
all n < N as well. By (11), we haveÃ
NX
n=1
λn
τn
!
− λwτw = ρ
NX
n=1
µ
Lln
µβny
τn −
βnw
τw
¶
+Mmn
µαny
τn −
αnw
τw
¶¶
Examine a typical term in the summation. We have
βny
τn −
βnw
τw = γL
µλw
τw −
λn
τn
¶
Sn > 0 (where Sn =
1− λn − λw
sp − λ2w/τw − λ2n/τn
> 0)
and αny
τn −
αnw
τw =
γM
snm
µλw
τw −
λn
τn
¶
> 0
But then because each term in the summation is strictly positive, part (i) follows.
Lemma 13 (Lower bound on λN) If A3 holds in equilibrium, then λN > 1N τNτN+τw ε¯ > 0, where ε¯ is the
constant from Lemma 11.
Proof. We have λN ≥ λn for all n, so by Lemma 11, NλN + λw > ε¯ holds. By Lemma 12, we also
have λw ≤ N τwτN λN , combining the two yields NλN
³
1 + τwτN
´
> ε¯. Rearranging yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 8
For each case, τw small and τx large, we must show that (i) λNτN > λwτx+τw , so by Lemma 4 a market
order trader holding N would sell on its good news, and (ii) a market order trader would choose source
N . Consider point (i) first. Fix τx and τw such that τxτw > N τNτ1 , and suppose toward a contradiction thatλNτN ≤ λwτx+τw in equilibrium. Consider the following implications.
(1) λn/τn < λw/τw for all n. This follows from τx > 0 and λn/τn increasing in n.
(2) βnw > 0 for all n by Lemma 10.
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(3) βny > τnτw βnw > 0 for all n. This follows from the fact that βny/βnw = τnτw
³
1−(λn/τn)Sn
1−(λw/τw)Sn
´
and
λn/τn < λw/τw (where Sn = τ ξn/ (1− λw − λn) > 0).
(4) λN/τn ≥ 1NR, where R = 1λw
PN
n=1 λn. (This follows from λn ≤ λN for all n.)
(5) αny ≥ 0 for all n. For N , this follows from our assumption that (i) fails; for n < N this follows from
Proposition 7.
(6) αnw ≤ 0 for all n. This follows from point (5) and the weak positivity of αnx = −
¡αny + αnw¢.
(7) R ≥
³PN
n=1 lnβny
´
/
³PN
n=1 lnβnw
´
. From (16) and points (5) and (6).
(8) R ≥
³PN
n=1 lnβnw (τ1/τw)
´
/
³PN
n=1 lnβnw
´
= τ1τw . From points (2), (3), and τ1 ≤ τn for all n.
(9) λN/τn ≥ 1N τ1τw . From (4) and (8).
(10) λwτx+τw <
1
N
τ1τw . From
τxτw > N
τNτ1 .
(11) But by hypothesis, λNτN ≤ λwτx+τw < 1N τ1τw , contradicting (9).
Thus, τxτw > N
τNτ1 implies
λNτN >
λwτx+τw , and therefore, a market order trader holding N will sell on good
news. Point (i) follows for τx suﬃciently large or τw suﬃciently small.
Now consider point (ii). Let g (τ ,λ ; (τx, τw)) = g (τN ,λN ; (τx, τw)) be the market order indiﬀer-
ence curve through (τN ,λN ) at an equilibrium given τx and τw. Write λUB (τ ; (τN ,λN) , (τx, τw)) and
λLB (τ ; (τN ,λN ) , (τx, τw)) for the upper and lower branches of this indiﬀerence curve. We make two
claims, deferring a proof of the first one until later:
Claim 1: For τx suﬃciently large, or for τw suﬃciently small, λLB (τ ; (τN ,λN ) , (τx, τw)) < 0 for all τ > 0.
Claim 2: For any particular τx and τw, if there is an equilibrium in which some market order traders choose
source n < N , then λn ≤ λLB (τn ; (τN ,λN ) , (τx, τw)).
Proof: Optimality of n requires that (τn,λn) lie on a (weakly) broader-jawed hyperbola than (τN ,λN );
thus (τn,λn) lies above λUB or below λLB. However, if (τn,λn) lay above λUB, then the traders would sell
on good news at n, which Proposition 7 rules out. Thus we must have λn ≤ λLB (τn ; (τN ,λN ) , (τx, τw)).
We also have λn ≥ 0 for all n, in any equilibrium, so Claims 1 and 2 establish that for τx suﬃciently
large or for τw suﬃciently small, market order traders do not choose any source except N .
Proof of Claim 1: One can readily show that the lower branch of an indiﬀerence curve g (τ ,λ ; (τx, τw)) =
g¯ lies below the λ = 0 axis if the slope of its asymptote is negative. A necessary and suﬃcient condition
for this is g¯ > 0. Thus it will suﬃce to show that g (τN ,λN ; (τx, τw)) > 0 for τx suﬃciently large or τw
suﬃciently small. We have
g (τN ,λN ; (τx, τw)) =
λ2NτN (τx + τw)− λw (2λN + λw)
τN (τN + τx + τw)
Now we make Claim 3: There is a constant K > 0, independent of τx and τw, such that λ2NτN ≥ K for τx
suﬃciently large or τw suﬃciently small. We defer a proof. Claim 3 plus the boundedness of λw and λN
imply that g (τN ,λN ; (τx, τw)) > 0 for τx suﬃciently large. Finally, it is not hard to show that λw must
tend to zero with τw. Thus for τw → 0, we have g (τN ,λN ; (τx, τw))→ λ2NτN τxτN (τN+τx) > 0.
Proof of Claim 3: By Lemmas 11 and 13, we have λ2N/τN > ε¯2/τN > 0. For the case of τx → ∞, we
are done, as ε¯ does not depend on τx. For the case of τw → 0, observe that ε¯ increases as τw declines, withε¯∞ = limτw→0 ε¯ > 0, and ε¯∞ not dependent on τw. Then, for all τw suﬃciently small, we have λN > 12 ε¯∞
and thus λ2N/τN > (ε¯∞)2 / (4τN ) > 0.
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